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"We depart from a great tradition . ... " 
NUMBER I 
-DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING.t 
J USTICES MURPHY AND RUTLEDGE died, were buried, were mourned-and were replaced. Justice Douglas was absent most of the term with an injury. On October 3, 1949, at the first session of the new 
term, Chief Justice Vinson concluded his memorial remarks with the 
words, "Saddened by our losses but inspired by the examples of devotion 
to duty which Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge have pro-
vided for us, we tum to the work before us."• By the first opinion day, the 
bar knew that the "work before us" consisted, in substantial part, of 
rejecting the work and the philosophy of the late justices. 
Since chance had spun the wheel, it was appropriate that the symbol of 
change should be a pin-ball machine. It was a super pin-ball machine, 
product of one Gibbs, putting together several of the common games so 
that players could compete simultaneously, without having to wait their 
*This article is the fourth in an annual series and is written in part for the legal, social, 
and economic historians of the future who may find it useful to have a contemporary view of 
the work of the Supreme Court at the last term. The preceding articles on the I946 Term, IS 
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I (I947); 1947 Term, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I (1948); and 1948 Term, 17 
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. I (I949), will hereafter be cited by the date of the Term, i.e., I946 Term 
article. 
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. The author had a remote connection as coun-
sel with two cases referred to in passing in this article, and participated on an amicus brief in 
connection with one of the segregation cases discussed below. 
t Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 840 (I950) (apropos 
a patent point). 
• sss u.s. VIII, II (I949). 
I 
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turn. A district court and the ninth circuit had held this small-bore "flash 
of genius" worthy of a patent as a combination. On March 28, 1949, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 -
It takes four votes to grant certiorari. We shall never know; but if it 
could be proved, it would seem a safe wager that those four were Black, 
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. It was their kind of case. 
On October 12, 1949, the matter was argued, and on November 7, 1949, 
the first decision day, it was decided. With Murphy and Rutledge gone, 
and Douglas away, the case no longer presented enough of an intellectual 
problem to the Court to warrant discussion. A brief per curiam upheld the 
invention and its claims, with only Justice Black dissenting.3 
The docket of decided cases was a small one, perhaps the smallest in a 
century. Of the 94 opinions, two clearly overruled opinions of Justice 
Murphy.4 A law review article is no substitute for a seance, and this next 
observation of course cannot be proved; but it is very probable that at 
least twelve more cases would have come to opposite results if Murphy, 
Rutledge and Douglas had been voting,5 and it is quite possible that four 
more might have reached different conclusions.6 These cases constitute 
twenty per cent of the year's decisions; significantly, most of these cases 
resulted in restrictions of civil rights. They were the most colorful part of a 
term otherwise only rarely spectacular. Perhaps two dozen opinions, the 
smallest number since this series of articles was begun, are of sufficient 
general importance to have any lasting significance, though a vital free 
speech case and the segregation cases are enough to make the term memo-
rable.7 The principal spectacle of 1949-1950 was Leviathan-turning. 
2 Faulkner v. Gibbs, 170 F. 2d 34 (C.A. 9, 1948), cert. granted, 336 U.S. 935 (1949). 
J 338 u.s. 267 (1949). 
4 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 2oo (r95o); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
s American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Darr v. Burford, 339 
U.S. 200 (r95o); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (195o); Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters 
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (195o); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 68o (1950); United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (195o); United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 
(1950); United States v. Fleischmann, 339 U.S. 349 (195o); United States v. Kansas City Life 
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); United Statesexrel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (195o); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 
338 (1949). 
6 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ha2eltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (195o); Faulkner v. 
Gibbs, 170 F. 2d 34 (C.A. 9th, 1948), cert. granted 336 U.S. 935 (1949); Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co. v.LindeAirProducts, 339 U.S. 6os (195o);Manufacturer's Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 
304 (1949). 
1 For citations1 consult the section immediately below, 
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!. HIGH SPOTS OF THE YEAR 
The :five major opinions of the year all involved civil rights, though two 
also involved labor relations. Three of the :five, each by Chief Justice Vin-
son, were of particular significance. The :first of the major Vinson opinions 
was American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 8 upholding the non-Com-
munist affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. The opinion would not 
have been so important were it not for its dicta, which undermines much 
that Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes and their successors had done for thirty 
years to develop the "clear and present danger" test. This was the :first 
major defeat for freedom of speech in the Supreme Court since Chief Jus-
tice Hughes and Justice Roberts, coming to the Court in 1930, had re-
versed the trend of the Taft, Sutherland, Sanford Court. 
The other two major Vinson opinions involved segregation in graduate 
education. In Sweatt v. Painter/ and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, ro a unanimous 
Court declined the invitation of counsel for the Negroes to reconsider the 
entire legal basis of segregation in the United States; but it did hit hard 
against segregation in graduate education by requiring that separate 
schools be truly equal. The nature of legal education is such, held the 
Court, that segregation in that field cannot be permitted at all, and when 
a Negro student is admitted to a white university, he may not be sub-
jected to any racial distinctions. The dicta here, and in a related case in-
volving dining car segregation,zr may foretell an eventual reconsideration 
of the fundamentals of "separate but equal." 
The decline and fall of Thornhill v. Alabama;• and with it the First 
Amendment as a serious protection of picketing, was completed this year 
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke.13 The majority's opin-
ion, by Justice Frankfurter, reduced the right of peaceful picketing to a 
case-by-case determination of whether, in all the circumstances, it is 
"reasonable" to allow that conduct. The judgment to be made becomes 
so complex that a strike is scarcely likely to survive the determination by a 
hierarchy of courts. 
Last of the most significant cases is United States v. Rabinowitz.14 For 
several years, one of the hardest fought Supreme Court issues has been 
the extent of the "search and seizure" limitation upon police conduct. 
Two years ago the Court required a search warrant whenever it was rea-
sonably possible to get one. In Rabinowitz, a majority opinion by Justice 
8 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 9 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 10 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
n Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
12 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 13 339 U.S. 470 (1950). l4 339 u.s. s6 (1950). 
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Minton overruled that precedent. A legal pendulum, which had already 
been swinging crazily, thus took another wild swerve, though, it will be 
argued below, not necessarily a particularly undesirable one. 
Taking these opinions apart individually may obscure the dominant 
motif of the year, which can be seen only in a totality. The segregation 
cases were unanimous. In the fifteen other civil rights cases this year the 
new Court divided. In fourteen of these cases, it rejected the claimed 
right. In numerous other civil rights cases, it denied certiorari. This broad 
jump to the right in respect to civil liberties was the most important new 
development of the year.xs 
II. R:EGu.tATION OF LABOR AND BusiNEss 
LABOR 
The most important labor cases involved picketing and state legisla-
tion limiting the right to strike. There were, as always, lesser but still sig-
nificant matters, the most colorful of which was a spanking for the fifth 
circuit for allegedly giving too little attention to the mandates of the labor 
laws. 
It might not have appeared so clearly as a spanking but for the dissent. 
As everyone knows, the N~tional Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act look a little less demanding to the fifth circuit, covering 
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, than they 
do to most of the rest of the courts of the country. Ten years ago, the 
Labor Board brought to the Court a petition for certiorari from the 
fifth circuit alleging that that court had consistently failed "to give effect 
to the provisions of the Act that the :findings of the Board as to facts, if 
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." The Supreme Court reversed 
the fifth circuit in a manner which made clear its desire for that circuit 
to fall into line.16 
But it takes more than one admonition to convince the fifth circuit's 
able, colorful, tenacious Judge Hutcheson, and this year the Board filed 
five more petitions for certiorari telling the ten year old story over again. 
The Court granted two of them and reversed, in opinions tactfully as-
signed to Justice Clark, most recent appointee from that circuit.17 The 
•s For full discussion and citations on matters summarized in this paragraph, see the discus-
sion on civil rights, p. 20 infra. 
•6 NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940). 
•1 NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (1950), and a companion case, NLRB v. 
Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950). The three denied were NLRB v. Atlanta Metallic Casket 
Co., NLRB v. Massey Gin &Machine Works, Inc., and NLRB v. Wilson & Co., 338 U.S. 910 
(1950). 
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subject matter of the cases is too routine to be worth statement, and the 
certioraris would not have been worth granting if nothing but the immedi-
ate cases were involved. 
Justice Clark made no reference to the "special problem" of the :fifth 
circuit, treating the cases on the merits. But Justice Frankfurter, dissent-
ing, maximized the circuit's rebuke by protesting it: 
Since the record permits, we ought to attribute to a Court of Appeals not a willful dis-
regard of principle, and, as such, an abuse of discretion, but an honest desire to get light 
on happenings after the Board's orders relevant to its duties as a court of equity. 
Courts of Appeals are human institutions. By attributing to the Court of Appeals an 
abusive exercise of discretion when the record may fairly be otherwise interpreted, we 
... needlessly rebuke that court ... .'8 
Another matter with which the Court had dealt before, and on which 
it was now time to become peremptory, was the matter of discrimination 
by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen against Negro firemen. The 
Court had previously made it so clear that the Brotherhood could not, 
under the Railway Labor Act, enter into agreements under which Negroes 
were permanently assigned to the poorest jobs19 that, as the Court put it, 
this year's case presented "a continuing and willful disregard of rights 
which this Court in unmistakable terms has said must be accorded Negro 
firemen." The Brotherhood hoped it had some procedural wrinkles as de-
fenses against an injunction suit, particularly a defense under the Norris-
. LaGuardia Act. This the Court thrust aside in a word, saying, "If, in 
spite of the Virginia, Steele and Tunstall cases, there remains any illusion 
that under the N orris-LaGuardia Act the federal courts are powerless to 
enforce those rights, we dispel it now."•o 
Far more important was the clarification of ambiguities arising from a 
decision the term before, International Union, UAW v. WERB,•r involv-
ing the power of states to limit the right to strike. The Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts recognize the employee's right "to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." May states put limits 
of their own on those concerted activities? 
In the U A W case of the preceding term, the Court had upheld a Wis-
consin prohibition of a strike method which the majority found similar to 
the sit-down strike. The union there had argued that Congress had filled 
IS NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 339 u.s. 563, 576 (I950). 
'9 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. I92 (I944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Engineers, 323 U.S. 2IO (z944). 
•• Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). 
21 336 U.S. 245 (z949). 
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this legislative field, and that the states could not devise new limits of 
their own. It was unclear from the earlier opinion whether the Court had 
upheld Wisconsin (a) because this kind of strike was not, due to its pe-
culiar nature, within the federal protection of "concerted activities" at 
all; or (b) because the state was empowered to put such limitations as it 
liked on the right to strike despite the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. 
As the situation was summarized in the article at the close of the last 
term: "The point is vital. If labor activities are outside the scope of major 
constitutional protections, and if such labor activities are now also re-
moved from the protective covering of the Taft-Hartley Act, then states 
may do as they will with labor's 'concerted activities.' The showdown 
may come upon review of recent state laws forbidding strikes in public 
utilities, which, like any other strikes, are also 'concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining.' New Jersey and Wisconsin courts 
have recently held that under the instant decision the states are free to 
take public utility strikes out of the protection of [the Acts] by declaring 
such activities 'illegal.' Even more significantly, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan has interpreted the UAW decision to uphold the requirements 
of Michigan law that strikes be approved by a majority vote of all em-
ployees in a bargaining unit. But it is extremely doubtful that the UAW 
decision, although ambiguous, meant the Taft-Hartley Act protection to 
be dependent to this extent upon state predilections."22 
This year the Michigan case just referred to came to the Supreme -
Court, which made very clear that it had upheld Wisconsin the year be-
fore only because the conduct there involved, due to its sit-down quality, 
fell "outside the protection of the federal act." Otherwise, said the Court, 
"None of these sections [of the federal acts] can be read as permitting 
concurrent state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress 
occupied this field and closed it to state regulation."23 
Words could scarcely be clearer. They say that, where interstate com-
merce is involved, states cannot put limitations on "peaceful strikes for 
higher wages." Nonpeaceful strikes, or strikes for other purposes, remain 
to be argued about. 
Fourteen years ago in Senn. v. Tile-Layers Protective Union, Justice 
Brandeis said, "Members of the union might, without special statutory 
authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for 
22 1948 Term article, 8-9. 
•J Int. Uniqn, UAW, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (195o). 
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freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."24 Exactly 
what that passage meant in its context in 1937 is arguable, but for a time 
it did not seem to matter. In Thornhill v. Alabama/5 three years later, 
the Court refused to permit a state to enjoin all peaceful picketing in a 
conventional labor dispute on the theory that picketing was a form of 
speech protected by the principles of freedom. A few years later, the 
Court restated the Senn dictum as a categorical proposition, ignoring all 
questions of a special meaning that it might have had in its context.26 
The dictum thus passed from an aside to a :flat statement of the right, as 
a constitutional matter, to "make known the facts of a labor dispute." 
The principle of law which thus evolved was as important as picketing 
itself, because it was widely, though perhaps carelessly, understood to in-
sulate peaceful picketing from state controU7 The Thornhill case has been 
invoked hundreds of times in strikes. 
That the Supreme Court had never meant to push the immunity of 
picketing as far as some had thought became apparent a year ago in the 
case of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.28 There the union sought to 
compel an employer to commit certain practices which were in violation 
of the state anti-trust laws. The Court held that the picketing, though 
peaceful, had no protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when it 
was directed toward an illegal purpose. The Giboney case thus opened 
wide the possibility that the ruling of Thornhill could be largely undercut 
if labor objectives were, with due ceremony of law, made illegal. 
Two cases this year so widened the entries to this zone of illegality as 
to leave very little of Thornhill. In Building Service Employees v. Gazzam/9 
all the employees of a particular employer had, in a free and fair election, 
voted not to join a building service union. The union thereupon began 
picketing the employer to induce him to force his employees into the 
union. A Washington state court enjoined the picketing. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Minton, applied the prin-
ciple of the Giboney case, and referred to two categories of labor conduct: 
first, acts which are "an abuse of the right to picket," and, second, "acts 
2 4 30I U.S. 468, 478 (I937). 
25 3IO U.S. 88 (l940). 
26 Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943). 
2 7 For brief reference to the leading cases, consult I948 Term article, 5 et seq. 
28 336 U.S. 490 (l949), noted in x6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 7ox (x949). 
29 339 U.S. 532 (l95o). 
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which are a means of peaceful and truthful publicity."30 The measure of 
difference was whether the conduct desired of the employer was consonant 
with "the public policy of the state." In Giboney the employer could not 
comply with the request without violating provisions of the state criminal 
law. In Gazzam, no criminal provision was involved, but the employer· 
could not force his employees into the union without violating the general 
principle of state legislation that employees should have uncoerced free 
choice in their selection of bargaining representatives. The absence of 
criminal sanctions was immaterial since they are only one evidence of 
"public policy," and other evidence would do as well. 
What Giboney and Gazzam had in common was that the public policy 
which the employer would violate if he yielded to the pickets was to be 
found in explicit legislation of the state. The case of International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Hanke3' took a far longer step away from Thornhill 
because no legislation was involved.32 In Hanke, another Washington 
case, the teamsters had picketed peacefully to compel a seller of used cars 
and his employees, all members of his family, to join the union. The ulti-
mate purpose had been to win compliance with a union rule against week-
end and evening work, since if the small independents were open at those 
hours it was difficult for the union to maintain its standards elsewhere. 
The Washington court enjoined the picketing. 
This time the "public policy" was made by the supreme court of 
Washington, with no legislative support. That court, in this case, said 
that the union's interest "is far outweighed by the interests of individual 
proprietors and the people of the community as a whole, that individual 
and little business men and property owners shall be free from dictation 
as to business policy .... "33 
In upholding the injunction Justice Frankfurter, for the three Justices 
who agreed with him, cut the earlier picketing decisions to their barest 
bones. The Senn case was pushed back to its facts and the passage quoted 
above was treated as dictum not to be read in the light of subsequent in-
terpretations put upon it. Three subsequent cases were reduced to their 
facts with an observation that it is "the Court's duty to restrain general 
expression in opinions in earlier cases to their specific context."34 
3• Ibid. 
31 339 u.s. 470 (1950). 
3• See also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), in which the same majority as 
in the Hanke case upheld a California injunction against picketing, the Justices who dissented 
in Hanke concurring separately. 
33 Ibid., at 477· 34 Ibid., at 480 n. 6. 
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What, then, is the ruling which emerges? Justice Frankfurther here 
transfers to the picketing field his entire theory of due process of law, that 
all state restraints are valid which have any rational support.35 He states 
his decision in stating his conclusion: "[W]e cannot conclude that Wash-
ington, in holding the picketing in these cases to be for an unlawful object, 
has struck a balance so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free people 
that it must be found an unconstitutional choice."36 Justices Minton, 
Reed and Black dissented. 
The majority opinion leaves little effect for the Thornhill case. Labor 
disputes are in their nature so volatile that they must be subjected to 
very clear rules. Were the rule that peaceful picketing must be per-
mitted when it does not require an employer to violate a clearly stated 
statute, labor could understand and the police could enforce it. When, 
however, the pickets and the police are supposed to guess whether or not 
the conduct desired by the pickets of the employer is (a) compatible with 
a not-yet announced state policy which (b) "is consistent with rooted 
tradition of a free people," the "rule" can satisfy only those who appraise 
law at the level of verbalisms on the books rather than in terms of its 
practical consequences in human affairs. 
All this makes a difference only if picketing makes a difference. Perhaps 
it does not. Picketing is vanishing from all the basic industries except for 
token purposes, because where a union is substantially the whole of the 
labor force, it is easier and just as effective to strike by staying home 
rather than by carrying signs. Picketing today is very nearly a phe-
nomenon of the direct consumer-contact trades-the bakers, the laun-
derers, the milk distributors, the restaurants, or, in this case, the used car 
dealers.37 Data as to the quantity of picketing currently being carried on 
are not available. While it is small, relative to the total volume of or-
ganized labor, it is not insubstantial. To the extent that picketing is prac-
ticed, this decision, turning the prerogative of enjoining picketing back to 
the state courts for substantially any reason of labor policy which may 
appeal to them, is an important development in labor relations. 
This case is but another signpost on a judicial road toward govern-
mental control of labor relations: three years ago, the Lewis case;38 last 
year, the validation of anti-closed shop restriction and the first peaceful 
3S See the concurring opinions of the Justice in Malinski v. New York, 304 U.S. 401 (1945), 
and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
36 339 u.s. 477, 478 (1950). 
37 Those are the trades involved in several of the series of Supreme Court cases. 
38 United Mine Workers v. United States, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
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picketing limitations ;39 this year the Gazzam and Hanke cases and a 
refusal by a majority even to hear the complaint against the fabulous 
:fine put on the United Mine Workers. 4" If organized labor ever was the 
favorite of the judiciary, it is so no Ionger.4' 
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 
There were no broadly significant trade regulation cases this year. The 
only exception may be Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine 
Research, lncY Hazeltine is a radio patent-holding corporation, which 
licenses its hundreds of patents en bloc, but which requires the licensee 
to pay royalties on all sales of radio parts regardless of the extent to which 
it actually uses the Hazeltine patents. Hazeltine had licensed to this de-
fendant 570 patents and 200 applications, of which defendant actually 
used ten. In a royalty suit, the licensee contended (a) that the entire 
agreement was void because of the system of charging royalties on sales 
of non-patented articles; and (b) regardless of the first point, that the 
patents were invalid. The licensor replied that the payment system did 
not void the licensing agreement, and that a patent licensee was estopped 
from challenging the validity of patents. Justice Minton for the majority 
upheld the licensor on both points. 
Petitioner contended that the payments arrangement violated the prin-
ciple of the "tie-in" cases. Those cases had held illegal requirements of 
the purchase of unpatented goods as a condition of obtaining a patent 
license; they forbade the requirement that the licensee refrain from com-
petition with the licensor; and they held illegal the granting of one patent 
license conditioned upon acceptance of another.43 The Hazeltine case was 
obviously none of those cases. The licensor did not compel the licensee to 
purchase unpatented goods, or to refrain from competition, or to use 
39 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) 
(closed shop); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing). 
4° Int. Union, United Mine Workers v. United States, 177 F. 2d 29 (1949), cert. den. 338 
U.S. 871 (1949), Black, Reed, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting. 
41 Other important labor cases of the year were: (a) Colgate-Palmolive-Feet Co. v. NLRB, 
338 U.S. 355 (1949), rejecting the so-called "Rutland Court" doctrine of the Board and hold-
ing that the Board could not, in effect, set aside a closed shop agreement of such long duration 
that it patently no longer reflected the wishes of the actual employees. For extended discus-
sion, consult Koretz, Rejection of the Rutland Court Doctrine, r Syracuse L. Rev. 425 ( 1950); 
(b) Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950), holding the Fair Labor Standards Act 
applicable to private operators of government owned munitions plants operated under cost-
plus contracts. 
"'339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
43 The cases are collected in notes r, 2, and 3 to the opinion of the Court. Ibid., at 83o-3r. 
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licenses he would otherwise not want. On the other hand, what the 
licensor did require is very similar to the previous tie-ins. Since the li-
censee must pay a royalty based on total sales regardless of whether he 
used the licensor's patents, there is a strong incentive to the licensee not 
to use someone else's patents, for which he would in effect be paying a 
second time. 
Since the law would have to expand somewhat beyond any existing 
precedent to render illegal this type of license agreement, the case be-
comes something of a sample of how the new Court decides when the law 
will expand. The majority opinion of Justice Minton begins by :finding 
that the conduct complained of is not squarely within any existing case. 
It proceeds, "This royalty provision does not create another monopoly; 
it creates no restraint of competition upon the legitimate grant of the 
patent."44 Since the latter half-sentence covers the only point in issue, it 
in effect combines the ruling and the reasoning of the case. 
On the issue of whether a licensee should be able to attack the validity 
of a patent, there has for a long time been an earnest, if minority, view 
that licensees should be allowed to challenge the validity and that any 
case to the contrary should be overruled. As Justice Douglas said in dis-
sent in this case, "No other person than the licensee will be interested 
enough to challenge them. He alone will be apt to see and understand the 
basis of their illegality."45 To this Justice Minton responded, "The gen-
eral rule is that the licensee under a patent license agreement may not 
challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties due 
under the contract. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310."46 
This and the other patent cases of the year are only straws in the wind, 47 
but they suggest the tentative hypothesis that the new Court will stick 
much closer to the strict boundaries of the precedents in the law of trade 
regulation than did its predecessor.48 Each of the precedents which the 
Court distinguished in respect to tie-ins had themselves created new law 
44 Ibid., at 833. 
45 Ibid., at 840. 
47 Faulkner v. Gibbs was discussed in the text at note 2 supra. Consult also Graver Tank & 
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 6os ( 1950), giving a most liberalinterpretation to the 
"doctrine of equivalents." This year's cases have created a vivid impression, apparent from 
informal observations collected among lower courts, that the Supreme Court has now aban-
doned the "tough" patent anti-trust policy of Stone, Black, and Douglas, and has moved 
toward the "soft" policy of Frankfurter and Jackson. In recent years the Court has barely 
and ineffectively held in check the unlimited enthusiasm of the Patent Office for giving a 
patent on almost anything. For discussion, consult 1948 Term article, 19-24. 
48 Note the manner in which, in the instant case, the Court stops at the exact edges of the 
precedents. 
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when they were decided. The new Court apparently wishes that process 
of development to stop. 
OTHER PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS 
As usual, there was a miscellaneous variety of business problems, 
largely routine. The principal bankruptcy case was Manufacturers Trust 
Co. v. Becker, 49 involving an application of the "Deep Rock" doctrine. 
The issue, put generally, is the degree of scrutiny the courts will exercise 
over transactions between directors and their corporations on the basis of 
which the directors make claims in bankruptcy. In the Deep Rock case, 
Taylor v. Standard Gas Co.,50 the Court had held that the bankruptcy 
court should exercise equitable powers to subordinate the claims as credi-
tor of a dominant shareholder who had mismanaged and under:financed 
the corporation. The underlying principle was expanded in Pepper v. 
Litton in an apparently careful and deliberate dictum: 
A director is a fiduciary .... So is a dominant or controlling stockholder ... their 
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their 
contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the direc-
tor or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its in-
lzerent fairness . .. .5' 
In the Becker case, the corporation became insolvent in 1942. During 
the three years following, relatives and associates of one of the directors 
purchased sixty per cent of an outstanding bond issue at from three to 
fourteen per cent of face value. In 1946, the corporation filed a petition 
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and under the ultimate arrange-
ment, these bonds were to be paid off at forty per cent of face value. 
Other claimants contended that the director's associates should be paid 
off only to the extent of their actual investment. 
The majority opinion, by Justice Clark, quietly appears to abandon 
the Pepper ruleP The Court did not require the director's associates to 
meet any burden of proof, but rather "intuited" that "on this record the 
probability that an actual conflict of loyalties arose from the oppor-
tunity to purchase ... is not great enough to justify the exercise of equity 
49 338 U.S. 304 (1949), noted in 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 675 (1950). 
so 306 u.s. 307 (1939). 5I 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). 
s• The principle had previously been struck a glancing blow in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 
U.S. So (1943), holding that neither Pepper nor any other "principles of equity announced by 
courts" (at 87) would support an SEC ruling that directors and related interests which had 
purchased preferred stock pending reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act were limited to their purchase P!ice; but cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
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jurisdiction."53 No "burden" whatsoever was placed on the director. 
Since in these matters, only the insiders are likely to have enough infor-
mation to carry a burden of proof, the placing of the burden is a vital 
factor in the disposition of cases of alleged improprieties prior to bank-
ruptcy. Under Pepper, there was some chance of catching up with the 
slick wrongdoer as well as the obvious wrongdoer; the Becker case returns 
to putting a premium on the wrongdoer's adroitness. 
Members of the law teaching profession will be particularly interested 
to note that Professor Walton Hamilton, recently "retired" to active 
practice after many years of commenting on the Supreme Court, this 
year argued his first case in that tribunal. As has been the case before 
with Professor Hamilton, his cause was stronger than his precedents. In 
the Secretary of Agric. v. Central Roig Refining Co.54 the ultimate issue 
was the validity of an order of the Secretary sharply limiting the refining 
of sugar in Puerto Rico. The order, Puerto Rico contended, was engrafted 
on to the general national sugar quota system. That territory is permitted 
to grow sugar, but it is not permitted to refine nearly as much as it pro-
duces. Desperate for manufacturing enterprise to relieve its terrible eco-
nomic circumstances, the territory is anxious to increase the volume of its 
refining. Alleging that the federal government could not permanently 
keep Puerto Rico in a depressed state by forbidding it to engage in its 
most obvious manufacture, Professor Hamilton and others for Puerto 
Rico challenged either the government's order or the act on which it was 
based. Unfortunately from the Puerto Rican point of view, the Court 
could find nothing in the Constitution except the due process clause 
which might restrict the power of Congress in this respect and the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Frankfurter held that the sugar licensing system 
of which the Puerto Rican restrictions are a part was not so "arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or unfair" as to violate that clause of the Constitution.ss 
Of the remaining matters of concern to the business community, the 
year's developments in respect to eminent domain and to tideland oil 
stand out. 
53 338 U.S. 304, 313 (1950). 
54 338 u.s. 604 (1950). 
55 Justice Black dissented on other grounds. Episode in oral argument: Mr. Hamilton had 
stepped slightly to the left of counsel's lectern, and the Chief Justice, fearing that Justices at 
the right end of the Bench might not be able to hear clearly, said, "Mr. Hamilton, would you 
mind stepping to the right?" Mr. Hamilton, complying, replied, "Certainly not, may it please 
your honor, I'm quite in the habit of being asked to step to. the right." 
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a) Eminent domain. 
Aside from due process, few matters are as completely thrown into the 
lap of the judiciary by our constitution as is the law of eminent domain. 
The few words in the Fifth Amendment which provide that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use "without just compensation" have 
been the foundation of a tremendous legal structure. That structure was 
extended this year. 
Determination of the standard of payment for articles condemned in 
war time presented serious problems. Two years ago, the Court saw the 
question of whether the ceiling price should be the standard of value in 
war time and skittered away from it. 56 This year, in United States v. Com-
modity Trading Corp., the question recurred.s7 The company during the 
war owned a very large share of the American supply of pepper and 
declined to sell to the government at the ceiling price. The government 
condemned. 
Opposition to making the ceiling the "value" lies primarily in the fact 
that the ceiling price is set with no necessary regard to the highly particu-
larized factors which would go into an eminent domain value judgment. 
On the other hand, if large suppliers could force the government to con-
demn for more than the ceiling price, in large areas there might be nothing 
left of the ceilings.s8 
The Company contended, and the Court of Claims held, that one of the 
elements of value for eminent domain purposes should be "retention 
value" or the value which represented the right to hold the goods, if need 
be, until after the war. The argument was supported by the contention 
that the Price Control Act had not meant to compel sales by unwilling 
vendors. 
The Court divided on other points but there was unanimity in the 
result of Justice Black's disposal of this contention. "Retention value," 
he said, assumes something which does not exist, namely the right to 
retain as against the government. The power of eminent domain, one 
s6 United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948), summarized briefly, 1947 Term article, 
13 n. 49· 
57 339 U.S. 121 (1950). In the third footnote to the opinion, the Court noted in passing that 
Congress has power, if it wishes, to determine rates of "just compensation" and that an Act so 
doing would have to be reviewed on the same-and no stricter-basis as any other statute 
alleged to violate the Constitution. The note thus rejected dicta denying Congress any power 
in the premises in Monongahela Navig. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). 
ss For discussion of some of the problems presented in the context of one industry, see Na-
thanson and Hyman, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations, 
42 Ill. L. Rev. 584 (1947). 
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which government is not capable of relinquishing, is one as against which 
there can be no right to retain. As for the choice of the measure of value, 
Justice Black said, "We think the congressional purpose and the necessi-
ties of a war time economy require that ceiling prices can be accepted as 
the measure of just compensation, so far as that can be done consistently 
with the objectives of the Fifth Amendment."59 If the imposition of ceil-
ing prices would, because of some peculiar circumstances, be unfair to a 
particular person, that person must sustain "the burden of proving spe-
cial conditions and hardships peculiarly applicable to it."60 
In two other eminent domain cases the Court was again confronted with 
the perpetually perplexing problem of the determination of the standard 
of value to be applied to property damages caused by the alteration of 
river levels as a result of federal flood control, irrigation, or power devel-
opments. As was argued in this article a year ago, this can be an extremely 
important question for the future development of public power, and may 
be of crucial significance in the development of the Missouri Valley.61 
Ultimate questions turn on difficult legal theories involving the rights 
of riparian owners in flowing waters. A few observations have a safe 
basis: 
I. Under the rule of United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Co.,62 no 
person can acquire, except by direct grant from the government, a prop-
erty interest in the flow of a navigable stream. If improvements have 
been made in a navigable stream without government license, they may 
be destroyed without cost to the government, and if land is taken along 
a navigable stream for a power project, it is to be valued on bases apart 
from any claimed right to use the water. In short it cannot be appraised 
at the so-called "power value" which could well be the highest value it 
might have. 
2. These principles were once held not inapplicable to nonnavigable 
streams. In United States v. Cress,63 it was assumed that the running wa-
ter of nonnavigable streams could be privately owned. In that case the 
level of a nonnavigable stream was raised, destroying the value of an in-
stallation in that stream, and the government was required to pay for it. 
3· On any theory, for any kind of stream, if the government floods 
over the high water mark of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream, the 
flooding is regarded as a taking for which the government must make 
59 339 U.S. I2I, I25 (1950). 
61 For discussion, consult 1948 Term article, 13-18. 
62 229 u.s. 53 (1913) 
6o Ibid., at 128. 
63 243 U.S. 316 (1917). 
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compensation at some value.64 The problem of determining that value can 
conceivably be caught up in the issues suggested by the two preceding 
observations, but some compensation there must be. 
Twice before the government has asked the Court to overrule the 
Cress case and to eliminate the concept of a special property in nonnaviga-
ble streams.65 This year the new Court gave the Cress rule its first new 
vitality in many years. Two cases raised the problem. In one, United 
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,66 the issue was whether the government 
must make compensation for loss of irrigation water by persons along 
nonnavigable streams in the Central Valley Project of California, when 
the government diverted the streams. The Court, in an interestingly 
written opinion by Justice Jackson, cleared the mist which had long 
hovered over the source of the government's power to undertake multi-
ple purpose navigation, flood control, irrigation, and power projects. For 
years it had been the custom to append those projects to a highly fictional 
navigation power deduced from the commerce clause. Justice Jackson 
found that the power to "provide for the ... general welfare" gave power 
sufficient to cover "large scale projects for reclamation, irrigation or other 
control improvement."67 He then escaped the serious constitutional ques-
tion of the nature of the water rights of riparian owners by a happy find-
ing that as a matter of statutory interpretation of the reclamation laws, 
Congress intended that these claims be compensated regardless of any 
constitutional prerogative it might have had not to do so. 
The second case, on a related subject, United States v. Kansas City Life 
Ins. teo., permitted no such easy statutory escape.68 The claimant owned 
land along a nonnavigable creek, the land surface being slightly higher 
than the creek's ordinary high water mark. Claimant's land drained into 
the creek, and from there into the Mississippi. Operations by the United 
States on the Mississippi raised the level of the creek to the high water 
mark, thus cutting off the claimanes subsoil drainage. The land was thus 
''underflowed.'' 
Justice Burton for four Justices, Justice Clark concurring in the result, 
64 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), limited in respects which do not bear on 
this proposition in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 
(I94I). 
6s The problem was avoided in United States ex rei. TV A v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943), 
and United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). 
66 339 u.s. 725 (1950). 
67 Ibid., at 738. This was most ingeniously drawn out of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I 
(1936), the decision invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
68 339 u.s. 799 (1950). 
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invoked the Cress case and gave judgment for the claimant. Cress was 
thus reestablished as a precedent, the dissenting four Justices urging in 
vain that it be overruled. The majority divided its analysis into two 
questions: :first, "Whether the United States, in the exercise of its power 
to regulate commerce, may raise a navigable stream to its ordinary high 
water mark and maintain it continuously at that level in the interest of 
navigation, without liability for the effects of that change upon private 
property beyond the bed of the stream"; and second, "Whether the 
resulting destruction of the agricultural value of the land affected, without 
actually overflowing it, is a taking of private prope1;ty within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment ... . " 69 
The questions are quoted here because, for this reader at least, the 
opinion eludes full comprehension, and I hesitate to summarize it for fear 
of doing it injustice. The majority's treatment of the second question 
seems to eliminate the point of asking the :first. The Court accepted as a 
fact, under the second question, that the claimant's land had been "in-
vaded by the percolation of the water" and concluded that "whether the 
prevention of the use of the land for agricultural purposes was due to its 
invasion by water from above or from below, it was equally effective." 
The principal cases cited are those mentioned above holding that flooding 
requires compensation. 7o In short, in this branch of the opinion, the 
Court holds that underflow is one type of flooding and then applies the 
conventional rule for compensation in the circumstances. 
But those cases are equally applicable to navigable and to nonnavigable 
streams. It would therefore seem completely unnecessary to consider 
whether the government's power was different over the one type of 
stream than over the other, unless something is made to hang on it. An 
issue of value, as whether "power value" or "farm value," might depend 
on a determination of the Cress question, but here value was stipulated. 
The net effect is that the Cress rule appears to be restored and that the 
government is to be held liable on a theory of property rights for such 
alterations in stream flow as it may make, e.g., in the hundreds of non-
navigable streams in the Missouri ValleyY Since the dissent by Justice 
Douglas, joined by Black, Reed, and Minton, did not regard the raising 
of the stream level to the high water mark as flooding at all, it neces-
sarily reached the question of the Cress case: "But until today's ruling the 
69 Ibid., at 8oo-8o1. 
1• For example, United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). 
7< The possible consequences in the Missouri Valley axe considered in some detail in the 
1948 Term article, 13-18. 
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Cress case had been largely destroyed by intervening decisions. I would 
complete the process .... "72 
b) Tidelands. 
Three years ago the Supreme Court held that the United States 
rather than California owned the minerals in the lands under the waters 
off the coast of that state.n This year the issue was whether the same 
result should be reached as to the lands off Louisiana and Texas. 
The Louisiana case presented no serious issue which had not been 
decided in the California case and the Court unanimously gave judgment 
for the United States.74 But Texas raised different questions. Texas had 
come into the United States after some years of existence as an inde-
pendent republic. In return for Texas' retention of its substantial debts 
the United States had conceded to it "all the vacant and unappropriated 
lands lying withiil. its limits .... " 75 Hence, argued Texas, the reservation 
in the treaty of annexation gave it special rights to the under-ocean lands. 
The precise issue before the court in the Texas case was whether it 
should be referred to a special master to take scientific and historical 
evidence on the possible meaning of the language of reservation. The 
Court held that this was not required and gave judgment for the United 
States. 
Texas, like other states, entered the United States on an "equal foot-
ing" with all other states. This was expressly stipulated in the joint reso-
lution admitting Texas to the Union.76 That concept has hitherto been 
used to increase the prerogatives of states by holdings that their sovereign 
political rights, including the ownership of river beds, is as great as that of 
earlier states. 77 In the Texas case, the government contended that the 
"equal footing" clause might be a limitation on a state: "In our view, the 
present pertinence of the clause is that it not only gives a new State such 
additional governmental rights, powers, and privileges, as may be re-
7' 339 U.S. 799, 813-14 (1950). 
73 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
74 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). The Louisiana case had some newspaper 
notoriety when the State took the unusual step of asking for a jury in this Supreme Court 
proceeding, a plea quickly rejected on the ground that this was an equity proceeding. 
1s 5 Stat. 797, 798 (r845). 
76 Ibid., at 797· A petition for rehearing filled by Texas contends that the joint resolution 
offered two alternative methods of admission, and that the "equal footing'' clause was not 
contained in the alternative in fact used. As the the following discussion shows, if this point 
is factually well-taken, the opinion of the Court must be recast; but it may reach the same 
result on purely constitutional grounds, without reference to the joint resolution. Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 u.s. 559, 566 (I9II). 
77Brown v. Grant, n6 U.S. 207, 212 (r886); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U.S.) 212 
(1845); Case v. Toftus, 39 Fed. 730 (C.C. Ore., r889). 
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quired to raise it to the level of the previously admitted States, but, at 
least in the absence of express preservation of a superior status, it also 
cuts down any special privileges, powers, or rights-over and above those 
possessed by the other States-which a new State may have possessed 
prior to admission because of a unique position, such as Texas' national 
independence.' ' 78 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas (Reed, Minton, and Frank-
furter dissenting), adopted this view.79 It conceded that Texas may have 
owned the lands when it came into the Union, but that since, under the 
California case, no other state could own the subjacent lands, Texas, to 
be on an "equal footing," must have given up whatever rights it had. 
The case was decided on motion for summary judgment. Texas, urging 
that the case be referred to a special master, emphasized that the case 
"involves the largest area of land ever the subject of litigation before an 
American Court."80 The Court held the "equal footing" clause so clear 
that there was nothing for a master to consider. 
The Court appears to concede that, were it not for the "equal footing" 
clause, Texas would prevail under the "vacant and unappropriated land" 
clause. In other words, these two clauses are in conflict, and one must be 
read as a modification of the other. Except for a passing, two-word dictum, 
nothing in the precedents suggests that the "equal footing" clause must 
necessarily override the "vacant and unappropriated land" clause, in-
stead of being subordinate to it.81 Reference to a master might have per-
mitted fuller exploration of what Congress actually contemplated by the 
two provisions; but a reading of the briefs of the parties-and Texas filed 
a scholarly 240 page brief with a ros page appendix-leaves great doubt 
that any amount of further evidence would add any substantial "mean-
ing" to the words in issue. Texas argued that "Letters, speeches, and 
other documents will show conclusively that no one at the time made any 
contention that these lands would not belong to the new State,"82 but 
this in reality only further supports the most likely solution, that the 
Congress of the 184o's never thought about this problem one way or 
another. 
78 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), brief for United States at 6r-62. 
7~ United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The opinion of Justice Frankfurter is am-
biguous, but it seems to be more a dissent than a concurring opinion and is so treated in this 
article. 
8• United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (195o), brief for Texas at 226. 
8' In Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (x9n), the Court said that under the principle 
of equality, one state is not "less or greater'' than another. 
82 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (195o), brief for Texas at 25, 26. 
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III. CIVIL RIGHTS 
American civil liberties history, like American economic history, is cy-
clical. Every twenty to thirty years we experience an economic Depres-
sion. Every twenty to thirty years we also experience a civil-liberties 
Repression. These cycles do not normally coincide-rather, our Repres-
sions follow about twenty years after our Depressions. 
This Repression cycle began with the alien and sedition scare at the 
beginning of the I9th century and continued to the anti-Masonic move-
ment about I83o, the climax of nativism in the I85o's, the anti-anarchist 
frenzy of the I88o's and I89o's, and the Great Red Scare of I9I8 to I927. 
As the cold war progressed during I949-50, the intensity of the current 
American Repression mounted. While a frenzy of fear was systematically 
whipped up, the task of the judicial historian became progressively more 
one of recording the evidence to show whether the judiciary was standing 
out against or bowing to the tide. 
In these recurring Repressions, neither the Bill of Rights nor the judi-
ciary has ever proved of much immediate significance. Jefferson did not 
think they would. In a remarkably penetrating analysis after the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, he said: 
It is still certain that tho' written constitutions may be violated in moments of pas-
sion or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may again 
rally and recall the people: they fix too for the people principles for their political 
creed.8J 
These pendulum swings until recently rarely came before the judiciary, 
but, on the basis of limited experience, an hypothesis may be advanced 
that courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least; for the Con-
stitution usually yields, as Jefferson thought it would, to repressionist 
drives.84 
The Repression decisions of the I92o's, then so vainly protested by 
83 Jefferson to Dr. Priestly, June 19, 1802, V Documentary Hist. Const. 25g-6o (1905). 
84 "Among liberals, the claim of the Supreme Court to respect as a guardian of civil liberties 
and the Bill of Rights has been taken with varying degrees of seriousness. In the last War, 
American public opinion displayed an intolerance not out of keeping with the national charac-
ter. [The reference is to World War I.] It had its comic side, as when sauerkraut was renamed 
(unavailingly) 'liberty cabbage,' and a more serious side in the legal and illegal repression of 
dissent. For offenses which in the case of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald led to no more serious 
penalty than boycott at a golf-club, Mr. Eugene Debs, the leader of the Socialist party, was 
sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, and th~ administration of the Espionage Acts was 
(by the standards of those times) very rigorous. Even imperial Germany treated its political 
dissenters less severely than did the great Republic. The Supreme Court did not attempt to 
limit the legislative excesses of Congress-which might have been less extravagant had the 
members of Congress been less tempted to the heresy that whatever was Constitutional was 
also right." Brogan, Politics and Law in the United States 91-92 (1941). 
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Holmes and Brandeis, stopped as a result of personnel change. ss The ap-
pointments of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in the places of 
Chief Justice Taft and Justice Sanford resulted in the five-to-four deci-
sions reversing the earlier trend. 86 The dying down of the national nervous-
ness in the late twenties eased this development. 
Personnel changes in the late forties now reopen the question of whether 
we are about to abandon the course begun by the coalescence of Hughes 
and Roberts with Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone. It may well be that we 
are about to return to the doctrines of the twenties. Prior to I949, a 
breakdown of the Court in terms of enthusiasm for the exertion of judicial 
power to maintain civil rights put Justices Murphy and Rutledge at the 
left end of the line, with Justices Black and Douglas near them; Justice 
Frankfurter far removed toward the center, and Justices Jackson, Reed, 
Burton and Chief Justice Vinson on the far right.87 With this year's 
replacements, the whole line moved so far to the right that the difference 
between Justice Black at the near left and Justice Frankfurter at the cen-
ter was almost eliminated.88 With a frequency amazing only until the 
certioraris denied are examined, 89 they were in dissenting agreement. 
A group of cases involving aliens suggest the temper of the times. 
In the by now famous case of Ellen Knauff, the :final appeal turned out 
to be not to the Supreme Court but to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Mrs. 
Knauff was a war bride, a German who had emigrated to other parts of 
Europe during the Hitler period and who in I948, having returned to Ger-
many, married an American soldier. When she sought to enter this coun-
try, the Immigration Service excluded her without notice or hearing on 
the ground that her admission would be "prejudicial to the interests of 
the United States." Since there had never been notice, hearing, charges 
or findings, no one, with the possible exception of the bureaucrats who 
entered the order, have any notion to this day as to why it was entered. 
Nothing on the face of Mrs. Knauff's record suggests anything preju-
dicial. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Knauff raised the question of 
whether she must have a hearing before she could be excluded. The Act of 
8s See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, 285-354 (1941), on the decisions of the 
192o's. Prof. Chafee analyzes the results of the personnel changes of 1930 at 357 et seq. 
86 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
87 Consult the civil liberties analyses of the 1946, 1947, and 1948 Term articles. 
88 Consult Table I, infra. 
89 The new policies concerning the granting of the writ of certiorari are discussed infra, and 
in Appendix A. 
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June 21, 1941, provides that the President may issue "reasonable rules, 
regulations and orders" which are to govern the entrance of aliens during 
a period of national emergency. One of the regulations in the pyramid 
which grew out of the statute permitted exclusions without hearings. The 
ultimate legal issue became whether these regulations were "reasonable," 
particularly in view of the general policy of the War Brides Act, which 
was intended to make it easier for soldiers to bring home their wives but 
which retained a caveat that the bride must still be "otherwise admissible 
under the immigration laws." 
The majority opinion by Justice Minton held the regulations reason-
able, with Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting and two 
Justices not participating.9" Said the majority, Congress may be as arbi-
trary about aliens as it wishes, and it need not give the courts the power 
of judicial review; in view of the fact that the alien has only a privilege 
and not the right of entry, the restrictions were reasonable. 
The dissenting opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson spend 
very little time on the statute and regulations. As Justice Jackson put it, 
"Congress will have to use more explicit language than any yet cited be-
fore I will agree that it has authorized an administrative official to break 
up the family of an American citizen or force him to keep his wife by be-
coming an exile."9r 
At this point the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, long a militant defender of 
individual rights, entered the picture. In a series of editorials it demanded 
that Mrs. Knauff be given a hearing. It placed full-page ads in the Wash-
ington papers stating the case, and interested Representative Walter of 
Pennsylvania in a private bill to admit Mrs. Knauff. Representative 
Walter carried that bill through the House. A veteran of r8 years in Con-
gress, and a highly respected conservative, even he was unable to get any 
information from the Immigration Service as to what its charges might 
be. Mrs. Knauff herself has been kept on Ellis Island on and off for 22 
months as of the date of this writing, and the Walter Committee could 
see her only by subpoenaing her. The bill went to the Senate where, late 
in the 8rst Congress, it appeared to have been blocked by Senate Judi-
ciary Chairman McCarran.9• 
Meanwhile, the Knauff case was back in the courts. The Immigration 
Service, in a frenzy to be rid of Mrs. Knauff before she could undermine 
9• United States ex: rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
9I Ibid., at 551-52. 
92 The bulk of the information in this and the succeeding paragraph is taken from St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch clippings for which I am indebted to Mr. Irving Dilliard of that newspaper. 
,. 
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the nation from her vantage point on Ellis Island, attempted to whisk 
her out of the country before Congress could act-and thus investigate. 
A new habeas corpus proceeding interrupted this haste. Twenty minutes 
before Mrs. Knauff was to be put into an airplane for Europe by the Im-
migration Service under orders discreetly marked "no publicity," Justice 
Jackson issued a new order requiring that the matter should be held in 
status quo until new proceedings for certiorari were disposed of.93 No fur-
ther action can be taken until fall. 
The Knauff case, though it is only one family's tragedy, deserves such 
full attention here if it is symbolic of the attitude of the new Court. "The 
law," insofar as there is any preponderance, does lean against Mrs. 
Knauff. On the other hand, every element of human decency in the case 
supports her. That is to say, Congress did give the executive power-
which it possessed and could give-to be extremely arbitrary in this field; 
and perhaps it gave as much tyrannical and arbitrary power as the Immi-
gration Service chose to take. It is significant that neither dissenting opin-
ion has any real "legal" material to support its position. On the other 
hand, it is almost unbelievable that if Congress had really thought about 
it, it would have submitted war brides to this kind of treatment, and a 
judge would certainly not be false to his oath of office if he let a little 
humanity temper the rigor juris by requiring that Congress make abso-
lutely explicit an intention to commit such an act as this. 
Here the new Court was willing to follow the slight preponderance in 
the weight of the conventional legal materials, without giving any con-
sideration to where the road led. And yet in another alien case, United 
States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy,94 the same majority's behavior 
was the exact opposite. There the issue was whether a statute which per-
mitted deportation of aliens who committed certain offenses should be 
applicable to a naturalized citizen who was not an alien when he com-
mitted the offense, but who later became an alien again by denaturaliza-
tion. If the strict wording of the statute were followed, the petitioner 
could not have been deported, since he was not an "alien" when the of-
fense was committed. The majority opinion by Justice Burton, expanded 
the statute by interpretation to permit the deportation.95 Thus two aliens 
9J N.Y. Times, p. r, col. 2 (May r8, rgso). For an earlier stage of the matter, before the 
Jackson order but subsequent to the Supreme Court opinion, see r8r F. 2d 839 (C.A. 2d, rgso). 
94 338 U.S. 521 (rgso). 
9S The dissent of Justice Frankfurter, joined by Black and Jackson, JJ., reveals the extent 
to which it was necessary for the majority to manipulate the statute to reach its result. The 
Frankfurter opinion said in part: "the statute, in terms, refers to aliens 'who ... may here-
after be convicted/ not persons who are citizens when convicted and later transformed into 
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are deported, one by strict and the other by loose construction. 
From this one should not for the moment deduce that the Court js 
"anti-alien." In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, it put a crimp into thou-
sands of deportations by requiring that once aliens, unlike Mrs. Knauff, 
were in the country, they could not be deported without a hearing which 
met the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, and were 
held "before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing stand-
ards of impartiality."96 
The Sung and Knauff cases underline the importance for legal purposes 
of whether an alien subject to American power has once come into the 
country. The Sung case was written by Justice Jackson. His opinion in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager illustrates that the alien outside our borders is out-
side of the protection of our law.97 
The issue in the Eisentrager case was whether aliens, in this case Ger-
mans, convicted by an American military commission abroad for "war 
crimes," could secure limited review of their convictions in an American 
court. Justice Jackson declared that they could not. Since these petitioners 
were convicted before an American military commission, it would follow 
that the Germans whom Justice Jackson himself convicted at Nuremberg 
before an international tribunal were also beyond judicial review.98 
aliens by the process of denaturalization. And this view of the statute is reinforced by the 
legislative history as well as by considerations relating to the impact of the Court's decision 
upon various other congressional enactments not now before us. 
"The Committee reports and congressional debate make plain that Congress was principally 
concerned with the status of about 500 persons who had been interned by the President during 
the First World War as dangerous alien enemies and about r5o aliens who had been convicted 
under various so-called war statutes. Congress could not have been unaware that naturalized 
citizens may lose their citizenship; yet nowhere in the legislative history do we find the re-
motest hint that Congress had also such denaturalized citizens in mind." Ibid., at 534-55. The 
dissent ,also pointed out that citizens might be denaturalized for reasons involving no moral 
blame, and yet be subject to deportation under the prevailing interpretation. 
96 339 U.S. 33 (r95o). Some related problems suggested by the decision are discussed in 
38 Calif. L. Rev. 326 (r95o). 
97 339 U.S. 763 (r950). 
98 The most serious incidental aspect of the Eisentrager case is whether American civilians 
abroad are entitled to any kind of judicial review in the United States if they are imprisoned 
by the Army. If no American court has jurisdiction to consider the petition of a foreigner be-
cause he is not before the court, it obviously may be argued that they would have no more 
jurisdiction in the case of an American. The Solicitor General took the position that Americans 
abroad were thus completely subject to military power. The majority carefully avoided ac-
cepting that position, though as the dissent of Justice Black, joined by Douglas and Bur-
ton, JJ., pointed out, it will be logically difficult to avoid that conclusion when the issue is 
squarely raised in the light of this decision. 
The special interest of the dissent is in its willingness to have the judiciary assume the full 
responsibility of reviewing military convictions abroad. Excerpts from the concluding para-
graphs of the dissent are: 
"However illegal their sentences might be, they can expect no relief from German courts 
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The remaining civil rights problems are so diverse that they may con-
veniently be divided into four groups: (a) criminal procedure; (b) Con-
gressional procedures; (c) free speech, and (d) segregation. 
a) Criminal procedure. 
The most important fact about the five criminal procedure cases, four 
of which were decided against the defendant, was that in four of the five, 
the certioraris were granted last year,99 while the fifth was apparently 
taken for the purpose of overruling the Murphy opinion of two years ago 
on a matter of searches and seizures.100 
In other words, the former Court had an interest in criminal procedure, 
both state and federal, which left an inheritance now disposed of by this 
Court. Since January I, 1950, certiorari has been granted in only two cases 
involving the constitutional aspects of criminallaw.101 It seems safe to 
predict that this branch of the law will for a time be swept under the rug 
of certiorari denied. 
A decision setting aside a conviction of a Negro because of discrimina-
tion in the selection of a grand jury was of interest only because Justice 
Clark concurred specially to express some doubts about the wisdom of 
reversing a conviction on that ground, while Justice Jackson dissented 
essentially on the ground that grand juries are of no great importance 
anyway.102 A right to counsel case had as its main interest the fact that 
Justices Clark and Minton joined a majority in applying the rule that 
counsel is not constitutionally required where there is no "fundamental 
unfairness."103 The minority on this issue, which has contended that poor 
or any other branch of the German Government we permit to function. Only our own courts 
can inquire into the legality of their imprisonment. Perhaps, as some nations believe, there is 
merit in leaving the administration of criminal laws to executive and military agencies com-
pletely free from judicial scrutiny. Our Constitution has emphatically expressed a contrary 
policy .... "Ibid., at 797-98. 
"Conquest by the United States, unlike conquest by many other nations, does not mean 
tyranny ..•. Our constitutional principles are such that their mandate of equal justice under 
law should be applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew only 
over thirteen colonies .... I would hold that our courts can exercise [habeas corpus] whenever 
any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any land we govern. Courts should 
not for any reason abdicate this, the loftiest power with which the Constitution has endowed 
them." Ibid., at 798. 
99 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (195o); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (195o); Quicksall v. 
Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (1950); Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). 
too United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
101 The two cases are carried forward to the October, 1950 Term, as Campagna v. Hiatt, 
19 U.S. L. Week 3001 (July 7, 195o); and Dowd v. Cook, Ibid., at 3002. 
102 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). 
xoJ Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (1950). The rule applies to noncapital state court 
cases. 
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persons are entitled to counsel as a constitutional right, is thus reduced 
to two-Justices Black and Douglas. 
The more important cases were the two overrulings of decisions of Jus-
tice Murphy. In Wade v. Mayo,X"4 the Court through Justice Murphy had 
held that while a state prisoner claiming violation of a constitutional right 
at his trial must exhaust his state remedies before applying to the federal 
district court for habeas corpus, that exhaustion rule did not require him 
to pursue his "state remedies" to the point of petitioning the United 
States Supreme Court for certiorari from the state supreme court. This 
year Justice Reed, in Darr v. Burford,X"5 overruled the Wade decision, to 
which he had previously dissented. 
Since there are hundreds, and perhaps more than a thousand, con-
victed persons raising constitutional objections each year, apd since the 
Supreme Court could not conceivably review the cases of more than a few 
of them, the new rule puts another blind alley in the labyrinth of proce-
dures already confronting the convicted. In remarks to the circuit judges 
at the beginning of the term, Chief Justice Vinson emphasized the impor-
tance of assurance of a fair trial by proper post-conviction procedures. He 
said, "I firmly believe, despite the burden, that the right to petition the 
Supreme Court should remain and should not be made any more diffi-
cult."roG It now remains, but it is certainly more difficult. Justices Frank-
furter, Black, and Jackson dissented, and Justice Douglas did not 
participate. 
The search and seizure problem of United States v. Rabinowitz1" 7 in-
volved the circumstances under which a warrantless search may accom-
pany a validly warranted arrest. Up to four years ago, the law on that 
subject had been clear and workable: a search without a warrant accom-
panying a proper arrest could reach only objects in plain sight. The police 
were thus not required to blind their eyes to the obvious, but they were 
precluded from rummaging and ransacking!"8 At the I946 term, in Harris 
v. United States,X"9 the Court suddenly swung far, and a conviction was 
sustained based on an arrest following a five hour ransacking of a house 
without a search warrant. The defendant had been validly arrested, but 
for something quite different from that with which he was charged after 
the search. 
I04 334 u.s. 672 (!948). 
ros 339 U.S. 2oo (r9so). 
106 70 S. Ct., at xvi. 
I07 339 U.S. 56 (!950). 
108 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. r92 (r927), as modified in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (r93I), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (r932). 
109 33I U.S. I45 (r947), discussed briefly, r946 Term article, 24 et seq. 
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At the 1947 term, the Court swung just as far the other way. In Tru-
piano v. United States,n• Justice Murphy introduced a mod.i:fi.cation into 
both the Harris ru1e and the preceding "plain sight" rule. His opinion 
required police to have a warrant if there was reasonable opportunity to 
obtain one. But this made the law look foolish; in Trupiano "search" 
which consisted of noticing the stills which surrounded a moonshiner, 
when he was validly arrested, was held illegal because the police cou1d 
have obtained a search warrant. 
The only happy solution to the extreme of Harris and the counter-
extreme of Trupiano wou1d be to overru1e both of them and put the law 
back in the perfectly satisfactory shape it had before the "improvements" 
began. In the Rabinowitz case, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Minton, 
overruled Trupiano. The case may also indicate an intention to put some 
limitation on Harris. In Rabinowitz, a warrant was issued for the arrest 
of the defendant for dealing in forged postage stamps. He was arrested 
in the small room in which his business was carried on, and the police 
without a warrant, searched his desk, safe, and file cabinet and found 
forged stamps. In upholding the conviction the Court emphasized, among 
other points, that these receptacles, at least, were in plain sight, that the 
search was confined to the room actually used for unlawfu1 purposes, and 
that the objects found were immediately related to the purpose of the 
arrest. These factors differentiate the Harris case. It was of course un-
necessary to reaffirm Harris in toto, and the Court did not do so. Whether 
it would do so if the question were presented thus remains a partially 
open question. 
b) Congressional procedures. 
Activities in Congress continued at the center of the civil rights stage 
during the year 1949-50. Those activities took two primary forms. Most 
dramatic was the repetition of fabu1ous charges by a few irresponsible 
but noisy persons. By the end of the year, the process of indiscriminate 
and unsupported accusations was beginning to meet strong opposition 
from leaders of both parties.m 
Those abuses of democratic process were the backdrop for the other 
congressional activity, committees of inquiry. The committees, armed 
with the subpoena power, searched for evidence which might lend credence 
to the unsupported charges which had precipitated them. As a resu1t, a 
IIO 334 U.S. 6gg (1948). 
111 Consult, for example, the remarks of Senator Margaret Chase Smith, g6 Cong. Rec. 
Soor (June r, rgso). 
HeinOnline  -- 18 U. Chi. L. Rev.  28 1950-1951
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 
series of legal problems arising from the committees' activities are begin-
ning to reach the Court. 
In the C'Ommittee hearings, witnesses are in a difficult position. If they 
answer questions, they risk the possibility that some renegade may turn 
up to be believed on a charge of perjury. If they decline to answer, they 
may be held in contempt. An increasing number have chosen to risk the 
contempt charge. 
In United States v. Bryan,Z12 the issue was whether excerpts from testi-
mony could be read to a jury to convict a witness of contempt in view of a 
statutory provision that "no testimony given by a witness before any com-
mittee of either House shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceed-
ing ... except perjury." Defendant, charged with contempt, rather than ' 
with perjury, contended that the testimony which was the basis of the 
alleged contempt could not be read to the jury. The majority, through 
Justice Vinson found this an "absurd conclusion" which was not within 
"the congressional purpose" although it was within the literal language 
of the statute. Justices Black and Frankfurther dissented, Justice Black 
contending that this restriction was no more absurd than the limitation 
on self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment. 
More important was United States v. Fleischman,u3 a companion to the 
Bryan case. Bryan was the actual custodian of the records of the Joint 
Anti-Fascist Committee. His refusal to produce the records was regarded 
as contempt. Fleischman was a member of the board of directors of that 
organization and had only as much control over those records ·as one 
member of a board of sixteen might have. The Court, again through Chief 
Justice Vinson, affirmed a judgment of her contempt despite the fact that 
the government did not prove that she could have done anything effective 
about the records. The majority held such proof unnecessary, concluding 
that in this case the burden of proof was on the defendant, to prove that 
she could not have had any influence on the board, rather than on the gov-
ernment. Justices Black and Frankfurter) dissenting vigorously, protested 
this transfer of the burden of proof to the defendant on the critical issue 
of the case. The dissent also hit hard at the indefiniteness of an order 
which somehow required the defendant to "try" to compel others to pro-
duce papers, without any indication of just what she was expected to do. 
Related, insofar as they arose from the loyalty program, were two cases 
involving juries in the District of Columbia. In Dennis v. United States,u"' 
defendant was charged with contempt of the House Un-Am.erican Com-
II2 339 u.s. 323 (1950). n 3 339 U.S. 349 (r9so). n4 339 U.S. r62 (r95o). 
HeinOnline  -- 18 U. Chi. L. Rev.  29 1950-1951
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1949-50 29 
mittee. Seven of his jurors were government employees. The Court held 
this not prejudicial in the circumstances. The majority opinion by Justic~ 
Minton, with a concurrence by Justice Reed, refused to hold that the. 
loyalty program did not disqualify government jurors. Indeed, a defend-·. 
ant was entitled to show that jurors might be disqualified for this rea-
son.us However, at the time of the. Dennis conviction, the Court thought 
the loyalty program was sufficiently new so that it could not, at that time, 
have created such a Gestapo atmosphere as to invalidate the conviction. 
Justice Black, dissenting, said: "Government employees have good 
reason to fear that an honest vote to acquit a Communist or anyone else 
accused of 'subversive' beliefs, however flimsy the prosecutor's evidence, 
might be considered a 'disloyal' act which could easily cost them their 
job. That vote alone would in all probability evoke clamorous demands 
that he be publicly investigated or discharged outright; at the very least 
it would result in whisperings, suspicions, and a blemished reputation."n6 
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, said: "Only naivete could be unmindful 
of the force of the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice Black, and 
known of all men. There is a pervasiveness of atmosphere in Washington 
whereby forces are released in relation to jurors who may be deemed sup-
porters of an accused under a cloud of disloyalty .... "n7 
c) Free Speech. 
American Communications Ass'n v. Doudsn8 is the most important 
decision on free speech in more than ten years. It begins a new cycle in 
the rising and falling history of the "clear and present danger" test. 
The clear and present danger test arises from the fact that while the 
First Amendment in terms prohibits any interference with freedom of 
speech, no judge has yet been found on the Supreme Court who is willing 
to apply the rule as an absolute. The problem of how free speech should 
be qualified has been particularly perplexing for the last thirty years. 
During World War I, Holmes enunciated his classic test, that speech 
might not be prohibited unless there was a clear and present danger of a 
ns In Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (195o), the Court, per curiam, reversed a de-
cision in a case similar to that of Dennis in which the defendant had not been allowed "to 
interrogate prospective government employee jurors upon voir dire examination with specific 
reference to the possible influence of the 'Loyalty Order' .... "At 259. For an excellent and 
comprehensive discussion of the problem, consult Heller, Justice, Jury Trials, and Government 
Service, 35 Corn. L. Q. 814 (1950). Mr. Heller observes, "If the loyalty program places govern-
ment employees in a category by themselves, the law can hardly close its eyes to such distinc-
tion." Ibid., at 823. 
116 339 u.s. I62, ISO (I950). 
117 Ibid., at x82. 118 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
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substantive evil which Congress had the right to prohibit.n9 Holmes's 
analysis there applied to "political speech"-to speech directed to affairs 
of state, and he had in mind punishment of the traditional fine or imprison-
ment variety. 
In the mid-192o's, such cases as Gitlow v. New York••o and Whitney v. 
California••• abandoned the clear and present danger test, substituting 
for it the so-called "bad tendency" test under which there was no longer a 
necessity of showing a real likelihood of serious consequences of speech, 
but rather merely a possibility of such consequences. 
The Holmes-Brandeis point of view received its ultimate statement in 
their concurrence in the Whitney case. Vital passages from their opinion 
in that case are these: "To justify suppression offree speech there must be 
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is prac-
ticed. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger appre-
hended is imminent .... [E]ven advocacy of violation, however reprehensi-
ble morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the ad-
vocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the 
advocacy would be immediately acted on." 
But who was to make the factual judgment implied by this test? Jus-
tices Brandeis and Holmes continued, "In order to support a finding of 
clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious 
violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct 
furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated . 
. . . It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging 
free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justify-
ing it."••• 
In the American Communications Ass'n case the issue was the validity 
of a provision in the Taft-Hartley Act excluding from the protections of 
that Act any union which has not appropriately shown both that its 
officers are not Communists and second, that its officers do "not be-
lieve in" or support any "organization that believes in or teaches" the 
overthrow of the government. The statute thus requires an oath both as 
to personal conduct and as to individual beliefs, and also requires the 
officer to take oath as to the "belief" of an organization. The principal 
"9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
120 268 u.s. 652 (1925). 
121 274 U.S. 357 (1927). T~e cases are well described in Chafee, op. cit. supra note 85, at 
319-51. 
122 The quotations are from the concurring opinion, 274 U.S. 357, 376-79 (1927). 
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opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, holding the Act valid, took the follow-
ing positions: 
(r) Substantial evidence was presented to Congress, on the persuasive-
ness of which the Court did not pass, showing that Communists engage in 
political strikes. 
(2) The restriction of the Act is more than a disqualification of in-
dividuals to hold office: "We are, therefore, neither free to treat Section 9 
(h) as if it merely withdraws a privilege gratuitously granted by the Gov-
ernment, nor able to consider it a licensing statute prohibiting those per-
sons who do not sign the affidavit from holding union office .... The diffi-
cult question that emerges is whether, consistently with the First Amend-
ment, Congress, by statute, may exert these pressures upon labor unions 
to deny positions of leadership to certain persons who are identified by 
particular beliefs and political affiliations." 
(3) Congress under the commerce power may attempt to prevent 
political strikes. Restrictions of this kind are similar to restrictions on 
bank directors in the underwriting business: "Political affiliations of the 
kind here involved, no less than business affiliations, provide rational 
ground for the legislative judgment .... " 
(4) The clear and present danger test is not a mathematical formula. 
Justice Brandeis in the Whitney case was considering restrictions on dis-
semination of doctrine. This case is different-here Congress is protecting 
commerce from interruption. The "danger" to be protected against need 
not be anything so spectacular as danger to the nation. "[L]egitimate at-
tempts to protect the public ... from present excesses of direct, active 
conduct, are not presumptively bad because they interfere with and, in 
some of its manifestations, restrain the exercise of First Amendment rights." 
(5) The Court must weigh the circumstances and appraise the sub-
stantiality of the reasons for such restrictions; but the Court must give 
due deference to Congressional judgment. Congress has not attempted 
to restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a political organi-
zation. The provision touches "only a relative handful of persons," and 
even that handful suffers only "possible loss of positions." 
( 6) The "beliefH provision is so broad that it must be saved by narrow 
construction. The "belief" is therefore interpreted to mean a "belief in 
the objective of overthrow by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional 
methods of the Government of the United States as it now exists under the 
Constitution and laws thereof."••l 
12l The quotations are from the opinion of the Court1 339 U.S 382, 390-408 (r95o). 
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Other contentions may be put aside. Ju~tice Jackson concurred on all 
points except the belief provision, which he thought unconstitutional. 
His concurrence was even more extreme than the majority opinion on its 
points of agreement. He declared-in dramatic derogation of positions 
previously held by him-that as a judge .he had no power to review this 
legislation except to determine whether there was "rational basis" for 
it.1•4 Justice Black dissented as to all aspects of the opinion. 
The majority opinion is summarized in some detail so that it may speak 
for itself. It makes prodigious innovations in the law of free speech. If 
the Court had merely upheld the statute, its impact might not have been 
so great; indeed, conceivably Holmes and Brandeis by applying their test 
might have come to the same result. But the opinion goes infinitely be-
yond the simple needs of the occasion, almost suggesting that we are to 
go back again to the Gitlow rule. In my own view, the opinion is a misfor-
tune in these respects: 
(t) "Conventional" restrictions of freedom of speech ordinarily con-
sist of putting the offender in jail. Our own generation is finding more 
sophisticated ways of achieving the same result by putting economic in-
stead of criminal sanctions on persons whose speech is offensive. These 
sanctions ought to be recognized as mere variants of criminal sanctions, 
and ought to be subject to the same tests. In the foreparts of this opinion, 
the Court appears to concede part of this vital ground, admitting that 
the exclusion from union office is more than the "mere loss" of a position. 
But later it appears to abandon the recognition that this is a penalty, and 
somehow minimizes it. This will encourage the belief that Congress can 
do indirectly what it may not be able to do directly by way of suppression 
of individual rights. 
(2) In the course of restating a clear and present danger test, the Court 
certainly does not improve upon it. Even friends of the test must concede 
that it was somewhat elusive;z•s but now it defies comprehension. 
124 Justice Jackson had previously been an exponent of the view that "The right of a State 
to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is con-
cerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' 
for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be in-
fringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and 
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Va. State Bd. of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
Another aspect of the case was the allegation that the oath provision was a bill of attainder. 
For an interesting pre-decision discussion, consult Wormuth, On Bills of Attainder, 3 West. 
Pol. Q. 52 (r950). 
12s A most illuminating analysis of the concept is Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the 
Clear-and-Present-Danger Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. II6-j (1950). 
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(3) The ultimate serious questions in these cases are, first, who is to 
decide whether there is a clear and present danger, and second, what 
standard is to be applied? In respect to the first of these questions, the 
majority opinion is closer to Holmes and Brandeis than the Jackson 
opinion, because the Jackson opinion abdicates this function altogether. 
But the majority opinion saves very little because of its answer to the 
second question. Its standards are so low that almost any act of Congress 
would appear to meet them. If the Court does not see any close relation in 
a restraint on banking practices and a restraint on free speech, it leaves 
very little of the First Amendment. Moreover, it sets forth none of the 
actual facts which appear to lead it to the conclusion that there is a clear 
and present danger. 
(4) The opinion leaves the impression that free speech is more subject 
to restriction when Congress is exercising the commerce power than 
would be the case if it were exercising some other power. It is novel for 
Congress to attack free speech with this weapon, but it is not true that 
any important difference should result. 
(5) This is the first case in American history in which belief as such, 
completely unrelated to individual action of any kind, has been made the 
basis of limitations on the rights of a citizen. 
The Black dissent comes close to declaring that speech, as such, should 
be beyond all legislative control until individuals commit illegal overt 
acts: "[T]he basic constitutional precept [is] that penalties should be im-
posed only for a person's own conduct, not for his beliefs or for the con-
duct of others with whom he may associate. Guilt should not be imputed 
solely from association or affiliation with political parties or any other 
organization, however much we abhor the ideas which they advocate .... 
Like anyone else, individual Communists who commit overt acts in viola-
tion of valid laws can and should be punished. But the postulate of the 
First Amendment is that our free institutions can be maintained without 
proscribing or penalizing political belief, speech, press, assembly, or party 
affiliation."126 
d) Segregation. 
This year the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, and its numerous friends, carried to the Court what it intended to 
be its ultimate challenge to legally imposed segregation. Southern repre-
sentatives girded for a last ditch fight. When the smoke had cleared, the 
126 339 U.S. 382, 452 (xgso). 
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NAACP had made less progress than it had hoped, but at least as much as 
it could have expected. 
The familiar story need not be repeated for any one likely to see these 
words. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
serted by victorious abolitionists to secure "equal rights" for Negroes. 
The pattern of segregation in America was then just emerging, and there 
is legitimate room for confusion over just what the phrase was intended 
to accomplish in respect to it. One answer to the Amendment was the 
widespread institutionalization of segregation. As Reconstruction fervor 
receded, the lords of creation reached a polite compromise under which 
Negroes were to be kept "separate but equal"; and that compromise re-
ceived at least qualified sanction from the Supreme Court in r896 in 
Plessy v. Ferguson.127 
There were three cases this year. In the case of Sweatt v. Painter128 the 
petitioner had been excluded from the regular University of Texas law 
school and referred to a special, colored law school set up by order of the 
lower court in this case. He declined that alternative and sued for admis-
sion to the University of Texas. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents129 
the petitioner had been admitted to the University of Oklahoma graduate 
school, but was segregated in various ways by special seating restrictions, 
special dining restrictions, and special library restrictions. In Henderson 
v. United Statest30 the petitioner had been excluded from a dining car be-
cause the few curtained-off "colored tables" were taken, though there 
were other empty "white tables" in the car. 
In each case, the NAACP attempted to precipitate the issue of the 
validity of segregation as such. Supported both on brief and orally by the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General, they asked that Plessy 'II. 
Ferguson be overruled. Briefs were compendious,131 and oral arguments 
extensive and well attended by an interested public. The Attorney Gen-
eral, who tradition dictates may speak unquestioned, is said to have pre-
sented a powerful and effective statement, gravely warning the Court 
that "Unless segregation is ended, a serious blow will be struck at our 
democracy before the world."r3• 
m 163 U.S. 537· The historical material bearing on the subject is collected in Frank and 
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," so Col. L. Rev. 131 
(19so). 
128 339 U.S. 629 (195o). 129 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 13° 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
13 1 That of the Committee of Law Teachers against Segregation in Legal Education was 
reprinted sub nom. Segregation and the Equal Protection Clause, 34 Minn. L .Rev. 289 (1950). 
132 18 U.S. L. Week 3277 (Apr. u, 1950). 
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The Court did not reconsider the Plessy decision as the Negroes and the 
government asked, nor reaffirm it as the defendants requested. Rather 
it found sound reasons for deciding the cases on other grounds. 
In the Sweatt case, the Court held the colored school "unequal" to the 
white school and therefore declared that Sweatt need not attend it. The 
important point was the breadth of the reasoning. The Court noticed, 
but did not stop with, the mechanical inequalities of difference in faculty 
size, course offerings, or libraries. Those are factors which, conceivably, 
enough money could cure. But the Court went on to those larger factors 
which, by their very nature, undercut all segregation at the graduate 
level. It noted "those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment but which make for greatness in a law school," the reputation of the 
faculty, quality of administration, influence of alumni, standing in the 
community, traditions, and prestige. 
"The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes 
from its student body members of the racial groups which number 85 per 
cent of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, wit-
nesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevi-
tably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a 
substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot con-
clude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that 
which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law 
School."133 This criterion should doom any segregated law school, and all 
the criteria taken together should knock out any segregated graduate 
school. 
So construed, Sweatt requires that Negroes be admitted to general state 
graduate schools. McLauri1t forbids segregation of students after their 
admission. It holds that a school may not "set apart" its students, be-
cause the restrictions would impair effective study and also handicap the 
students who wish "to engage in discussions and exchange views with 
other students.m34 
The Henderson case avoided the constitutional issue by holding that a 
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act forbade this type of discrimina-
tion. That provision, however, is so close in substance to the constitutional 
provision that the difference should not be signi:ficant.135 The case is im-
Ill 339 u.s. 629, 634 (1950). 'J4 Ibid., at 64r. 
'Js The statute forbids subjection of any person '~to any undue or unreasonable prejudice 
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever," and thus in effect makes the same mandate as 
the equal protection clause when it is interpreted to forbid "unreasonable classifications." 
24 Stat. 38o (r887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(r) (1929). 
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portant both because at least one kind of dining car segregation is declared 
"unreasonable," and because the unreasonableness lies solely in the fact 
of the separation of the races. The food, the prices, and the service were 
otherwise the same. 
The largest intellectual importance of these cases is that while they 
purport not to touch Plessy v. Ferguson, they do extensively undermine 
it. Plessy rested on a practical judgment that the judiciary was incapable 
of doing anything effective about race relations; hence the Court bowed 
to the inevitable. The Plessy majority was perfectly explicit about this.136 
The fact that the Court is now moving in this field shows that it does not 
share the complete pessimism of the Plessy majority. 
Plessy necessarily surrounded its practical judgment with some legal-
isms. One of these was that segregation is not a white judgment of colored 
inferiority, and therefore a discriminatory practice; and that if Negroes 
think otherwise it is because they are unduly self-conscious.137 The other 
was that segregation is not discriminatory because, while it is true that 
Negroes are kept out of white units, whites are kept out of Negro units, 
thus creating an equality of restriction.138 The recent decisions attacked 
both those premises. Sweatt flatly repudiated the second, saying, "It may 
be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from 
excluding white students from the new law school. ·This contention over-
looks realities."1 39 
The practical effects of the decisions are already beginning to appear. 
Texas has admitted Sweatt to its law school, and there will be at least 
two more Negroes in that University. Oklahoma announced that there 
would be 82-unsegregated-graduate students in its various divisions 
in the summer of 1950. 
On the other hand, Governor Talmadge of Georgia spouts fire at the 
thought of mixed education, and the Alabama legislature passed a most 
critical resolution and declared that it would not have mixed education 
in its lower schools.1 4° 
>36 The discussion at I63 U.S. 537, 550-52 takes the ground that law is "powerless" before 
"usages, customs and traditions" of race. 
>37 The Court said that segregration did not stamp "the colored race 'with a badge of in-
feriority"; if it did so, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Ibid., at 55I. 
138 Justice Harlan, dissenting, discussed this point in some detail. Ibid., at 557· 
I39 339 u.s. 629, 634 (I9SO). 
•4• The data in the two foregoing paragraphs is taken from miscellaneous news clippings. 
It is widely believed that reaction against the decisions in North Carolina caused the defeat 
of liberal Senator Frank Graham in a runoff primary immediately following the opinions. 
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The Alabama furor suggests the real problem of these cases. There is 
good reason to believe that many Southerners do not feel nearly as 
strongly about maintaining segregated education at the graduate level as 
they do about maintaining it in the grades. Assuming that such education 
must be even close to equal in fact, it is too expensive to maintain two 
systems.141 
What the South wants to avoid is (a) mixed primary and secondary 
education, and (b) the expenditure of the estimated billion dollars it 
would cost to put their primary and secondary systems into a state of 
even superficial equality. This year's decisions, by avoiding the ultimate 
question of Plessy v. Ferguson, do not decide whether the South must do 
one or the other. But by moving toward a test of real equality, the Court 
gives an omen that it means business up and down the line. 
SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS POSITIONS 
A summary of the positions of the Justices in the nonunanimous civil 
rights cases follows. As always, such data must be read with the greatest 
of care, for they may be misleading. This year very special warning must 
be given that the table includes only the cases in which the Court divided. 
The segregation cases therefore, are not in this table. 
In comparing this table with the data for previous years, it should be 
remembered, as will be shown in some detail, that the departure of two 
Justices broke the group of four which previously had been able to grant 
certiorari in many civil rights cases. Denials of certiorari undoubtedly 
kept some potential cases out of this table which might otherwise have 
shown more greatly the differences of view between Justices Black and 
Douglas and some of their brethren. 
When all the necessary qualifications are made, this table nonetheless 
has substantial residual value. If a given Justice's decisions put him pre-
ponderantly in one column or the other, then the figures contain a clue or 
hint as to his basic attitudes about civil rights. 
There were fifteen divided civil rights cases at the 1949 term.142 Dis-
141 An exchange in the oral argument between Justice Minton and Oklahoma's Assistant 
Attorney General Hansen is suggestive: Justice Minton: "When segregation has broken down 
as it has in Oklahoma, there isn't much point to segregation, is there?" Mr. Hansen: "Possibly 
[not] on the graduate's level." r8 U.S. L. Week 3280 (April II, 1950). 
142 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Building Service Union 
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (r95o); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (195o); Dennis v. United 
States, 339 U.S. r62 (r95o); Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (195o); Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 66o (1950); 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (195o); 
United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 68o (195o); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); 
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qualifications or absences result in some Justices having less than this 
number. 
TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN NONUNANIMOUS CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
lN SUPPORT OF CLAIMED lN DENIAL OF CLAIMED 
RIGHT RIGHT 
Per Cent PerCent 
1946- of 1946- of 
1949 48 Total Total 1949 48 Total Total 
Vinson 2 8 10 I3% 13 49 62 87% 
Black 14 39 53 75 I 17 18 25 
Reed 2 8 10 13 13 49 62 87 
Frankfurter II 23 34 47 4 34 38 53 
Douglas 2 47 49 83 0 10 10 17 
Jackson 6 14 20 29 9 41 so 71 
Burton 3 10 13 I6 12 47 59 84 
Clark I 13 7 7 87 
Minton 3 3 20 12 12 8o 
IV. LAWYERS' LAW 
Except for the developments relating to certiorari, there was substan-
tially nothing of interest this year in conflicts, federal jurisdiction, pro-
cedure, or legislation. The only exceptions arose in connection with the 
form of notice required by due process. In an outstanding discussion of 
the subject, Justice Jackson for the Court declared invalid a New York 
attempt to settle the accounts of a common trust fund after notice by 
publication. Thrusting aside the technicalities of "in rem" and "in per-
sonam," he declared that the interests to be balanced in requiring a type 
of notice are those of the state in settling :fiduciary accounts, and those 
of the individual to actual notice. Where notice is to be required, "the 
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Hence where bene-
ficiaries can by due diligence be located, though outside the state, they 
must have actual notice. As to all others, published notice will have to 
do.'43 
United States ex rei. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 ( 1950); United States v. Fleisch-
man, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); United States ex rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (195o), is essentially a duplicate of the American Commu-
nications Ass'n case. It is included in this table only to note the views of Douglas and Minton, 
JJ., who did not participate in the American Co=unications Ass'n decision. 
Unanimous civil rights cases, in addition to the three segregation decisions cited notes 128-
3o supra, were Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 
(1949); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 
(195o); Roberts v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 339 U.S. 844 (1950). 
'43 Mullane v. Gentr31 :e:anover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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Equally practical was the majority in Travelers Health Ass't~ v. Vir-
ginia!44 There the issue was whether Virginia could effectively serve a 
complaint by mail on an insurance company which was not in any tech-
nical way doing business in Virginia-except that it was selling insurance 
to Virginia residents by mail, as a result of general advertisements. Jus-
tice Black for the majority held that this was "doing business" quite 
sufficiently to permit mailed service to be binding under the Constitution. 
THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
As Justice Frankfurter puts it, "All that a denial of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought 
it should be granted."'45 In other words, the grant or the denial of the writ 
is wholly discretionary. But in the exercise of discretion to decline to hear, 
as in the exercise of other judicial discretion, patterns may appear. Some 
began to emerge in the new policies of the new Court. 
These features stand out in the practices developing this year: 
r. The Court is apparently desirous of cutting its docket to a very low 
volume. That level dropped so low this year that three Justices as pro-
lific as Hughes or Brandeis or Stone could have written all the majority 
opinions of 1949-50 with no perceptible strain. 
The Court is compressing its docket (a) by denials of certiorari; (b) by 
disposing of ten per cent of the few cases heard by per curiam opinions; 
(c) by very summary treatment of some matters. The Court's treatment 
of Dye v. J ohnson'46 is illustrative. That case raised very substantial and 
difficult questions of whether, in the circumstances, the Georgia chain 
gang was a "cruel and unusual punishment," and if so, whether a federal 
coUit might block an extradition back to Georgia through the writ of 
habeas corpus. The issues are sufficiently difficult to have given a superb 
court, the third circuit, a difficult time. Sitting en bane, that Court 
' through its distinguished senior Judge Biggs, decided the matter in a most 
interesting and earnest way. The Supreme Court summarily reversed 
without hearing argument, giving no discussion, and citing only one case, 
144 339 U.S. 643 (1950). Barr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), involving the jurisdictional 
question of the nature of the exhaustion of state remedies in habeas corpus cases, and Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), involving jurisdiction of American courts in habeas corpus 
suits by foreign prisoners, were discussed above in the civil rights section. Other cases involving 
jurisdictional points were Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (venue under 
FELA); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 ( 1950) {finality of order under 
Rule 54(b) prior to its recent amendment). 
145 State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 91_9 (1950). 
146 338 U.S. 864 (1949), reversing, per curiam, 175 F. 2d 250 (C.A. 3d,- 1949). 
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and that one not clearly in point.I47 Such abrupt disposition of a serious 
matter leaves the third circuit and the bar in real confusion. 
2. The Court is using its discretionary power to eliminate from its 
docket civil liberties problems which would have disturbed its predecessor 
Court. As was noted above, all but one of the criminal procedure cases 
heard this year were left over from the year before; and only two cer-
tioraris were granted in that field since January 1st. 
The new method of administering the certiorari jurisdiction amounts 
to a new conception of the pUiposes of the Judiciary Act of 1925. That 
act was intended to allow the Justices adequate time for serious issues, 
but it had not previously been supposed that they would need so much 
time as to result in a reduction of the docket to an average of only about 
ten cases per year per J ustice.X48 
V. THE INSTITUTION AND ITs JUSTICES 
THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTION 
As has been noted, the number of cases decided by opinion, including 
per curiams but excluding companion cases, was 94· At the preceding 
term the number was 122, and the term before that it was n9. Before the 
war, the docket usually ran to 200 and more cases a year. This reduction 
in the size of the docket this year was due primarily to the extraordinary 
rigor, discussed in the immediately preceding section, with which the writ 
of certiorari was administered. 
It was at the same time a season of extraordinary difficulty for the Court 
due to new and ailing personnel. Mr. King, in his biography of Chief Jus-
tice Fuller, suggests that "perhaps the worst year in the history of the 
Court was the term commencing in October, 1909, and ending in May, 
1910, just prior to Fuller's sudden death in July of that year. Justice 
Moody was entirely incapacitated, Justice Peckham died in October, and 
Justice Brewer the following March."x49 The October, 1949 term was 
147 338 U.S. 864 (1949). The order of the Court states, "The petition for writ of certiorari is 
granted and the judgment is reversed. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. II4." (1944). A reading of the 
Hawk case will give very little illumination. Did the Court mean (a) all persons in Johnson's 
position must bring their petitions in the court of the state in which they are a fugitive; or (b) 
in the court of the state of their original incarceration; or (c) did it mean merely that Johnson, 
as an individual, having started his own case in a Pennsylvania state court, would not there-
after be allowed to raise the issue in a federal court though other persons might do so if they 
had not made that beginning? For discussion of the problem, see Prisoners' Remedies for 
Mistreatment, 59 Yale L.J. Sox (1950). The Second Circuit, inferentially admitting that it was 
puzzled, hal given interpretation (a) to the order. U.S. exrel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, r8r F. 2d 
588 (C.A. 2d, 1950). 
148 An appendix, p. 52 infra, lists some of the cases denied certiorari this past session. 
149 King, Melville Weston Fuller 309 (1950). 
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almost as greatly handicapped, with two new Justices coming on the bench 
at the beginning of the year, Justice Douglas gone for almost the entire 
year, and Justice Reed, though able to participate in all the cases, in vari-
able health. 
One of the most obvious differences in the execution of the work of the 
Court was the increase of brevity.xso This clearly was due in part to the 
decline in the volume of dissents. The departure of Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge removed two very free dissenters, thus creating a greater 
unanimity. 
The distribution of majority opinions among the Justices is shown in 
Table 2.xsx 
TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY OPINIONS 
Vinson............... 10 Jackson.............. 13 
Black................ 12 Burton............... 9 
Reed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Clark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Frankfurter........... 8 Minton.............. 12 
Douglas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Per curiam. . . . . . . . . . . 9 
The loss of two of his closest intellectual associates and the absence of 
Justice Douglas reduced the influence of the views of Justice Black to the 
lowest point they have had for many years. For all practical purposes, the 
ruling group in the Supreme Court today is Chief Justice Vinson, Justice 
Burton, Justice Clark, Justice Minton, and any one other Justice-usu-
ally Justice Reed. 
These conclusions are illustrated by the tables that follow. The degree 
of prevalence of the views of particular justices can best be measured by 
concentrating on the most important of the decisions, and for this pur-
pose I have arbitrarily shown two groups of cases which seem to me to 
have the most important consequences to society. The first group consists 
of the five cases which seem the most significant of the year.X52 The second 
group of 21 cases are definitely less important, but are not routine.153 
zso Using a. measure of pages alone, the October, 1948, term occupies 1,483 pages in the 
Supreme Court Reporter, and the October, 1949, term occupies r,o32. Thus, the Court handled 
about 20 per cent less cases in about 30 per cent less pages. 
•s• This is a. strict count, excluding simple companion cases, cases not argued, and cases 
disposed of with an order not amounting to even a simple per curiam opinion. 
•s• American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Int. Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v, Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 
(195o); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (195o); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 lJ.S. 56 
~~- . 
>SJ Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Building 
Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 523 (1950); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 
U.S. 542 (1950); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. State Airlines Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950); Darr v-. Bur-
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The data iri Tables 3 and 4 are taken from these two groups. Disqualifica-
tions give some Justices less than the total of 26. 
Table 5 shows the detailed breakdown of the agreements among Jus-
tices in major and important cases. 
TABLE 3 
VOTING DISTRIBUTION IN MAJOR AND lliPORTANT CASES 











Major Important Total Major Important 
5 20 25 0 
2 I5 I7 3 
4 I6 20 I 
4 I2 I6 I 
2 3 5 I 
4 I3 I7 I 
5 I8 23 0 
4 I8 22 0 
3 I7 20 • I 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE IN MAJORITY MAJOR 






























Chief Justice Vinson, after four years on the bench, is now far more in-
fluential due to the new Truman appointees. There is no reason to suppose 
either that he dominates them or that they dominate him; rather, the 
group is like-minded. As has been shown throughout this article, and par-
ford, 339 U.S. 200 (195o); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (195o); FPC v. East Ohio Gas 
Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 338 
U.S. 232 (1948); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court, 
339 U.S. 46o (1950); Int. Union, UAWA, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); 
Secretary of Agric. v. Central Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950); Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (195o); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); Travellers Health 
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 
121 (1950); United States v. Fleischmann, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); United States v. Gerlach Live 
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). 
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ticularly by the data in the immediately preceding section, his and their 
views now prevail in substantially every important instance. 
One important difference between the Chief Justice's work this year 
and other years was in his selection of the opinions for himself. In some 
years past, he has chosen some very small matters. This year, however, 
he wrote the opinions of the Court in the two major segregation cases and 
in the Taft-Hartley free speech case.zs4 
From the standpoint of quality, the opinions of the Chief Justice con-
tinue without marked distinction. The principal criticism made in these 
articles in years past has been that the Chief Justice on occasion either 
did not squarely face intellectual obstacles or skirted them in exceedingly 
ingenuous and devious fashion by highly verbal distinctions. That criti-
TABLE 5 
AGREEMENTS AMONG JUSTICES IN MAJOR AND OOORTANT CASES 
Frank- Jack-
Vinson Black Reed furter son Burton Clark Minton 
Vinson 16 I9 I5 I7 23 IS I9 
Black 16 I5 I4 I3 I5 I3 16 
Reed I9 I5 15 14 IS I5 22 
Frankfurter I5 14 I5 2I I4 I2 I3 
Jackson 17 13 14 2I 16 12 I4 
Burton 23 I5 IS I4 I6 I7 IS 
Clark IS 13 I5 I2 I2 I7 I5 
Minton I9 I6 22 I3 I4 IS IS 
cism cannot be fairly repeated this year except for the Taft-Hartley free 
speech case, in which, to this reader, the opinion fails squarely to meet 
and overcome the obstacles between the Chief Justice and his result. 
From a technical standpoint, one of the best of the Chief Justice's opin-
ions of the year was United States v. Aetna Casualty Co.,Z55 a problem of 
subrogation under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
In his new position of "leader with allies," the Chief Justice remains a 
dominantly conservative influence in economic and civil rights matters. 
The one important exception is in race relations cases, in which he has 
'54 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (195o); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
•ss 338 U.S. 366 (1949). The case is discussed briefly in James and Thornton, The Impact of 
Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 429, 438-39 (1950). Prof. Ehren-
zweig, Assurance Oblige, Ibid., at 444, 451, citing the case says, "The Supreme Court of the 
United States recently permitted accident insurers to recover as subrogees from the Federal 
Government under a federal statute which in terms protects only the injured himself. It is 
regrettable that the court in so holding failed to consider the underlying economic issue 
whether risk distribution through taxation, necessitated by admitting subrogation, is preferable 
to risk distribution through the increase of first party insurance premiums caused by the denial 
of subrogation." 
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written memorable, though in some instances cautious, opinions leading 
the way toward reform.1s6 
For Justice Black, the I949 term brought the wheel of judicial expe-
rience to full circle. In r937, he came to the bench as a frequent lone dis-
senter. The years brought intellectual companions, and during the forties, 
his was a voice influential in the councils of the Court. In the year past, 
having outlasted his allies, he was again in the position of frequent dis-
sent. One difference was important: the intervening years have given 
Black a reputation as an outstanding jurist which means that the dissents 
have a fol~owing and weight. 
For Black personally; the release from majority responsibilities per-
mitted the :first relaxation since his appointment. For years he had ac-
cepted no more than one speaking engagement during a term, if that; this 
year he made several addresses. For years his work routine was early 
morning till late night during the term of Court; this year he found time 
for a few days in the West to visit Justice Douglas. 
Relaxation did not mean abandonment of duties. As always, he was 
among the :first in volume of majority opinions written. Three of the out-
standing from the standpoint of lawyer-like workmanship were United 
States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,X57 involving the cost in relation to 
ceiling prices of articles condemned in wartime; FPC v. East Ohio Gas 
Company,X58 applying the Natural Gas Act to certain intermediate trans-
portation of gas; and Solesbee v. Balkom,XS9 concerning the type of hearing 
which must be accorded allegedly insane persons before they may be 
electrocuted for capital offenses. 
His dissents were forceful, if hopeless. In the Taft-Hartley free speech 
case, he scored guilt by association and reaffirmed his conviction that 
Americans should be punished as a result of political beliefs only for overt 
acts actually committed by them.160 His dissenting opinion protesting the 
trial of a Communist before a jury largely composed of government em-
ployees, themselves all subject to the sanctions of the loyalty program, 
was read, according to a letter from a courtroom observer, "in a voice 
of scorn and steel.HI6x 
•s6 The Chief Justice adds the segregation cases this year to a list which already included 
the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 334 U.S. I, 24 (I948), and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 
(I948), involving the California lan,d laws directed against Japanese. 
' 57 339 U.S. I2I (I950). ' 58 338 U.S. 464 (I950). ' 59 339 U.S. 9 (I950). 
•6o American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (I95o). For daring of concept, 
this dissent and the dissent in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (I95o), are remarkable. 
' 6' Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. I62 (I95o). 
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For Reed, the year was one of peculiar disappointment. His health 
waned at the very moment when his intellectual powers could have had 
their largest consequence. Reed is closer in his views to the Truman ap-
pointees than the remainder of the residual members of the Roosevelt 
Court. Black's fall is paralleled by Reed's rise in influence. For years, 
Reed has been the civil liberties right wing of the Court. Others have now 
been added to that wing. Reed's experience and ability, both most exten-
sive, could make him the intellectual leader of the Truman group. He 
could well become the Sutherland to Vinson's Taft-the writer of the 
most important and most serious opinions for the new Court. By the end 
of the term the Justice's health was markedly improved, and he may well 
occupy that role in I95o-5I. 
But the Justice's stamina was not up to that opportunity this year. He 
wrote only :five majority opinions, less than any one except Justice Doug-
las. One excellent example of treatment of a neat but small matter was 
United States v. Burnison,X62 holding valid a California statute which pre-
cludes testamentary gifts to the United States. The most important Reed 
opinion, and one which illustrates his new influence, was Darr v. Burford, 163 
overruling Wade v. Mayo,X64 and holding that prisoners raising constitu-
tional objections to their trials must not only exhaust state remedies but 
must, as a part of that exhaustion, petition for certiorari. He brushed 
aside the Wade case, in which he had dissented, with the passage, "We 
do not stop to reexamine the meaning of Wade's specific language. What-
ever deviation Wade may imply from the established rule will be cor-
rected by this decision." Unfortunately, Reed's opinions are not always as 
crisp and to the point as that in the Burnison case; the Darr case becomes 
repetitious. 
Justice Frankfurter, as usual, wrote very few majority opinions, but he 
was otherwise active. His most important majority opinion was Int. 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke,X65 drastically limiting the constitu-
tional protections of picketing. This opinion is an excellent example of 
skillful use of legal materials. In other opinions, he continued his cam-
paign to inform the bar and his brethren of the true meaning of the writ of 
certiorari,X66 and held to his one-man program to abandon the so-called 
•6• 339 U.S. 87 (1950). 
•6J339 U.S. 2oo (1950). 
'6~ 334 u.s. 672 (1948). 
•6s 339 U.S. 470 (x9so). 
•66 See, e.g., State v. Baltimoxe Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). 
HeinOnline  -- 18 U. Chi. L. Rev.  46 1950-1951
THE UNNERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 
·"rule of four" by refusing himself to participate in some matters which 
four of his brethren had decided to hear ! 67 
The most colorful development concerning Frankfurter this year was 
that, after years of appearing at most a moderate on issues of civil rights, 
he has again been made into a "liberal" by the majority's turn to the 
right. Since the Black-Douglas wing of the Court no longer has the votes 
to grant certiorari in the cases which once divided them and Frankfurter, 
some of the differences among these Justices seemed to disappear. Frank-
furter brought to his new alliance the pungency with which he had sup-
ported his old one, as when he referred to an immigration act in dissent: 
"I deem it my duty not to squeeze the Act of May Io, 1920, so as to yield 
every possible hardship of which it is susceptible."168 
However, in terms of larger issues, Frankfurter was not nearly so com-
pletely isolated as Black. In the :five major cases of the year, he was in 
dissent only on that one involving searches and seizures.169 His limited 
concept of the role of the Court in reviewing alleged invasions of freedom 
of speech prevailed in the Taft-Hartley case,Z7° and his majority opinion in 
the picketing case carries his whole philosophy of due process of law very 
:firmly into an area where it had never been before.171 
Due to a serious riding mishap, Justice Douglas was unable to rejoin 
the Court until Spring. During his recuperation he published a best seller 
on his mountain climbing experiences and in the Spring he was chosen 
most unwillingly "father of the year." By the Summer of 1950 he was suf-
ficiently recovered to be able to undertake a new mountain climbing ex-
cursion in Iran. 
The Justice returned to the bench in time to write four opinions, the 
most important of which was the Texas tidelands case, which well exem-
plifies his sure, quick, touch.:r72 He also had the opportunity in a per 
167 Consult 1948 Term article, 37-38. Justice Frankfurter applied this view by refusing to 
participate in Carter v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949); Affolder v. N.Y. 
C. & St. L.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96 (1950); O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384(1949). 
While Justice Frankfurter refused to participate in these cases which his brethren wished to 
hear, he continued to display his independence by filing an extended opinion replete with 
English authorities in State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), which the other 
members of the Court chose not to hear. 
16s United States ex rei. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950). 
169 Cases cited note 152 supra. 
17° American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
1 71 Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke 339 U.S. 470 (1950). A Collection of the Jus-
tice's opinions was published this year, Konefsky, The Constitutional World of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter. Reviews with interesting insights into the Justice, pro and con, are Curtis and 
Rodell, 59 Yale L. J. 1009, ror3 (195o); Pritchett, 36 Va. L. Rev. 281 (1950). 
1 '12 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The serious new point raised by the Texas 
petition for rehearing, note 76 supra, does not detract from this conclusion. It had been 
overlooked in the original Texas brief. 
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curiam to note his view that the Taft-Hartley oath provision was un-
constitutional. I7J 
Justice Jackson had a fruitful year, writing thirteen majority opinions, 
and frequently exhibiting that freshness of view and superb writing style 
which are his trademarks. Two excellent examples of this fluency are his 
concurrence in the Taft-Hartley oath case, which was republished as an 
article in the New York Times magazine section and which reads as 
though it were designed for that purpose;I74 and his majority opinion in 
United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co.,X15 on eminent domain problems in 
connection with the Central Valley Project in California. This latter 
opinion may well be the best description, from a literary standpoint, 
which has ever been made of the Central Valley Project. The descriptive 
passages are at the expense of brevity, but the cost is small for the quality. 
Occasionally the Jackson opinions have an elusive touch. The remand 
order in Roth v. Delano176 is surely needlessly puzzling for a lower court; 
and his opinion on the treatment of Negro firemen by their union slides 
over the few points of moderate difficulty without much attempt to ex-
plain them.I77 On the other hand, his opinion in Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank,X78 on the requirement of notice in settling a common trust fund, 
is outstanding, as is his O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. &-E. Ry. Co., involving the 
Safety Appliance Act_t79 
Justice Jackson's sternest critics cannot complain that he is unimagina-
tive. illustrations are his dissenting opinion in a case in which the ma-
jority approved the disbarment by the Patent Office of an attorney who 
had planted a technical article under the signature of a purportedly im-
partial person and then cited it to the Patent Office as impartial evidence. 
Justice Jackson thought this mere ghost writing, a practice so common 
that the attorney could not be criticized for falling into it.180 Another 
illustration of the Justice's novelty of view is his dissent in a case reversing 
m Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950). The relevant passage of this per curiam order, de-
scribed in note 142 supra, is as follows: "Mr. Justice Douglas joins the dissenting opinions of 
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Jackson insofar as they hold 
unconstitutional the portion of the oath dealing with beliefs, and being of the view that pro-
visions of the oath are not separable votes to reverse. He therefore does not find it necessary to 
reach the question of the constitutionality of the other part of the oath." 
m American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 422 (1950) and quoted in 
"Justice Jackson on Communications in America," N.Y. Times, Mag. Sec., p. 12 (May 21, 
195o). 
•1s 339 U.S. 725, 727 (1950). •76 338 U.S. 226, 227 (1949). 
m Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 233 (1949). 
I7B 339 U.~. 306, 307 (1950). 119 338 u.s. 384, 385 (1950), 
II• Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 u.s. 318,320 (1949). 
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a conviction where there had been racial discrimination in the selection of 
a grand jury. The Jackson view was that so long as there was no dis-
crimination at the jury trial stage, discrimination at the grand jury stage 
was immaterial, thus in effect saying that grand juries are inconse-
quentiatz8x 
The two worst handicaps which Justice Burton has had to battle as a 
judge have been his tendencies both to prolixity and to fuzziness in opin-
ions. His strong point is not an instinct for the jugular, for the absolutely 
vital point of a case.x8• This year Justice Burton gained ground against 
those handicaps. His opinion on interest calculations on funds taken up 
by the Alien Property Custodian is very concise, and yet draws on gen-
eral factors sufficiently to give full illumination to the discussion.x83 An-
other :fine example is a decision concerning veterans' seniority under the 
Selective Service Act, carrying the law of that difficult and important 
subject "one step further."I84 His opinion concerning the deportation of 
denaturalized aliens who committed offenses during the period of their 
citizenship, while criticized above on the merits, must receive respect for 
its execution.'85 On the other hand, Savorgnan v. United States, holding, 
perfectly unobjectionably, that an American citizen had lost her citizen-
ship by becoming an Italian citizen, is prolix and is documented out of all 
proportion to its negligible significance.x86 
The two most important Burton opinions of the year were the dining 
car segregation caset87 and the eminent domain case discussed above, in 
which the government was held liable for damages resulting from raising 
the stream level of a nonnavigable tributary of the Mississippi River.xss 
I have confessed my own difficulty in understanding the purpose of the 
first half of that eminent domain opinion and just what it decides. 
The trouble with these technical considerations is that they take no 
account of Burton's rugged independence and the integrity of his results. 
Burton is basically conservative, and he behaves that way; but he cannot 
be typed. In a half-dozen cases this year, he again illustrated the manner 
' 8' Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298 (1950). 
' 82 Discussion, 1948 Term article, 53-54· 
'83 McGrath v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 338 U.S. 241, 242 (1949). 
' 84 Oakley v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 338 U.S. 278, 279 (1949). 
,ss United States ex rei. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 522 (1950). 
' 86 338 U.S. 491, 492 (1950). 
'87 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 818 (1950). 
,ss United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 8oo (1950). 
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in which he reached results which he may strongly have disliked. ' 89 Bur-
ton never prates of impersonality, but he displays that characteristic in 
marked degree. 
The primary interest of the bar this year is of course in the work of the 
two new Justices. Now that the first year's evidence is in, no very clearcut 
conclusion can be reached as to the capacities of Justice Clark. His opin-
ions are of average quality, neither particularly good nor bad. Probably 
the poorest is United States v. Toronto Navigation Co.,X9° involving the 
valuation of a car ferry condemned by the government during the war. 
The opinion is unnecessarily extensive in its statement of facts, verbose 
in its description of the central issues, and unilluminating in the nature of 
the directive which it sends to the court below. One of his best opinions is 
Wilmette Park District v. Campbell, discussing the application of an amuse-
ment tax to a local park district.'9' 
The principal criticism of the Clark opinions, like any other run of the 
mine work, is that they were neither original nor penetrating. His cases 
were decided in terms of the most obvious factors of the precedents or the 
most clearly apparent materials. An illustration is Treichler v. Wisconsin, ' 92 
Justice Clark's first opinion, which invalidates a provision of the Wiscon-
sin inheritance tax law as it applies to the taxation of tangible property of 
the deceased outside the state. Under a clear precedent, Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania,X93 such a tax on out-of-state tangible property violates the due 
process clause, and the Court so holds. 
The opinion contains a most remarkable sentence: "[T]he economic 
effects of tax burdens in the federal system cannot control our results, 
limited as we are to the words of the Fourteenth Amendment."'94 The 
law of due process on state taxation has never purported to be anything 
189 For example, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 498 (1950), holding 
the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to employees of private contractors operating govern-
ment owned munitions plants on cost-plus contracts. I strongly doubt that Burton's inclina-
tions took him to that result; but the law did. He also joined the majority in the following cases 
which may have been personally difficult: Wong Yang Sung. v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) 
(applicability of Administrative Procedure Act to deportations); United States v. Texas, 339 
U.S. 707 (1950) (tidelands); and particularly Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 
(1950) (service on foreign insurance companies with very thin connection of state of service). 
In the so-called "patriotic cases" the Justice had a slight tendency to wave the flag and let the 
eagle scream. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 337 (1946) (martial law in Hawaii); 
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 et seq. (1948) (renegotiation). Elsewhere he retains 
a very calm objectivity. 
19° 338 u.s. 396, 397 (1949). 
191 338 U.S. 4II, 412 (1949). 
1
9
2 338 u.s. 251, 259 (1949)· 
193 268 u.s. 473 (1925). 
194 338 u.s. 251, 256 (1949). 
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but a practical judicial adjustment of economic effects.195 The Court re-
iterates the traditional "benefit theory" of taxation, resting its result on 
the fact that Wisconsin gives no "benefit" in return for this tax on foreign 
property. Yet a footnote concedes that the benefit theory would not be 
applied if the physical property were abroad, and not in any state, for 
"so to do would have placed a premium upon the avoidance of all state 
taxes."1 96 But this exception swallows the entire logic of the benefit theory 
and suggests that it in turn is merely a legal way of talking about the 
avoidance of double taxation.1 97 
The point is that if a court were really "limited to the words of the 
Fourteenth Amendment" which neither says anything about state taxa-
tion nor had any known historical intention in respect to state taxation, 
one could not decide this case as Justice Clark decided it. There must be 
some reaso1ts why the Court has engrafted the tax limitation into the due 
process clause. These reasons are obviously economic, though this is 
denied; and statements suggesting what the reasons may be fit very 
poorly together. · 
There is a similar mechanical quality in Manufacturers Trust Co. 'II. 
Becker,X98 the bankruptcy case discussed above, which never quite touches 
upon the fundamental difficulties of protecting shareholders while at 
the same time not handicapping directors in their efforts to raise funds 
for small corporations. · 
A Senator from Indiana, assistant to President Roosevelt, and a judge 
of the seventh circuit for seven years, the new junior Justice, Sherman 
Minton, brings to the Court a background of amazingly extensive expe-
rience. As a Senator he had been the New Deal whip, renowned for his 
quickness of mind and tongue. 
Justice Minton's first year must have brought him some genuine unhap-
piness. His oldest and warmest friend on the Court was Justice Black. His 
admiration for Justice Douglas had been warmly and publicly expressed. 
'9S A leading analysis, with comprehensive bibliography, is Bittker, Taxation of Out-of-
State Tangible Property, 56 Yale L.J. 64o (1947). 
'96 338 U.S. 251, 257 n. 4 (1949). 
'97 The Clark note cites Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (r9n), holding taxable 
a fleet of steamships owned by a Kentucky corporation, permanently employed on the high 
seas. As Professor Bittker says, op; cit. supra note 195, at 645, "If the due process clause is 
violated by a tax on railroad cars which receive no police or comparable protection from 
Kentucky, how can an exception be found in the Fourteenth Amendment to support the 
taxation of the Southern Pacific Company's ocean-going steamships? The fact that these 
vessels receive no taxable 'protection' from their ports of enrollment or call in no way increases 
the 'protection' afforded them by Kentucky." 
!98 338 u.s. 304, 305 (1949)· 
1 
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Nonetheless, he found himself intellectually in most extreme disagreement 
with those old friends on fundamentals. Since of course he followed his 
convictions rather than his affections, those differences were frequently 
expressed. 
The principal criticism of Minton's opinions is a marked tendency to 
assume a point in issue. He retains a little of the legislator's tendency to 
make a case easier than it is by stating the question so that it admits of 
only one answer. For example, in one case the Court held that despite the 
community property law of California, a service man could exclude his 
wife as a beneficiary under a National Service Life Insurance policy. Jus-
tice Minton dissented, putting his position thus: "I cannot believe that 
Congress intended to say to a serviceman, 'You may take your wife's 
property and purchase a policy of insurance payable to your mother, and 
we shall see that your defrauded wife gets none of the money.' "'99 No one 
is very likely to doubt that Congress did not say "we will see that your 
defrauded wife" really is defrauded. 
Again, in a case involving the Labor Board's interpretation of an ex-
tremely obscure passage in its Act, Justice Minton begins his discussion 
of the point with the words, "The claimed impotency of the contract as a 
defense here rests not upon any provision of the Act of Congress or of state 
law or the terms of the contract, but upon a policy declared by the Board." 
We are then told that the policy of the Congress was different from the 
policy of the Board, and that its "policy cannot be defeated by the Board's 
policy."•oo 
This makes the case too easy. Obviously if what the Board did really 
does not rest "upon any provision of the Act of Congress," it cannot be 
sustained. Equally clearly, the Board cannot substitute its policy for the 
policy of Congress. The whole question of the case is, what is the policy 
of Congress? That question remains inadequately analyzed. 
This is the only serious criticism which can fairly be leveled at the 
199\Vissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 661, 663-64 (1950). 
••• Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355,362-63 (1949). Judge Learned Hand, 
in an essay on his colleague, Judge Swan, said, in 57 Yale L.J. 167, 170 (1947): "In addition he 
has-so far as it is given to any of us to have it-that merit which perhaps should rank highest 
in point of style: i.e. not to be misled into assuming the conclusion in the minor premise-not 
to beg the question. I can think of no single fault that has done more to confuse the law 
and to disseminate litigation. One would suppose that so transparent a logical vice would be 
easily detected; but the offenders pass in troops before our eyes, bearing great names and dis-
tinguished titles. The truth is that we are all sinners; no body's record is clean; and indeed it is 
only fair to say that much of the very texture of the law invites us to sin, for it so often holds 
out to us, as though they were objective standards, terms like 'reasonable care,' 'due notice,' 
'reasonable restraint,' which are no more than signals that the dispute is to be decided with 
moderation and without disregard of any of the interests at stake." 
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technical aspect of the Minton opinions. There is much to praise. The 
opinions are very much to the point, and leave no doubt for the lower 
courts as to what they are supposed to do. Minton is said by friends to 
have brought to the Court a determination not to write for the ages, but 
rather to decide the cases clearly and let it go at that. This he does. His 
best opinion of the year is United States v. Rabinowitz,"01 which, overruling 
an earlier opinion on searches and seizures, does so with great care and 
precision. Other outstanding Minton opinions are his majority and dis-
senting analyses in the two picketing cases in which he wrote.•o• 
CONCLUSION 
The new directions of 1949-50 have been discussed. One point remains. 
There has been some criticism of the new Court for the rapidi~y with 
which it abandoned what its predecessors stood for. In the Rabinowitz 
case just referred to, Justice Frankfurter strenuously criticized the Court 
for its overruling of a case only two years old: 
Respect for continuity in law, where reasons for change are wanting, alone requires 
adherence to Tmpiano and the other decisions. Especially ought the Court not reen-
force needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that Law 
is the expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's com-
position and the contingencies in the choice of successors.20J 
The criticism seems unfair. We cannot escape the fact that in the high-
est Court, the law is necessarily what the judges say it is and basic changes 
of personnel inevitably bring changes of doctrine and theory. It is per-
fectly fitting that this should be so. President Roosevelt is dead. His 
choices of Justices could not last forever. A new President having been 
elected, it is to be expected that the Court should adjust to new ways. As 
a result, the New Deal era in jurisprudence is gone. Those of us who regret 
the passing of the Roosevelt era from the Supreme Court can do so on far 
stronger ground than a mere attachment for stare decisis. We have all too 
much to lament on the merits. · 
APPENDIX 
The list following is an illustrative sampling of certioraris denied. 
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
(a) No. ro, Misc., Snell v. Mayo, 173 F. 2d 704 (C.A. sth, 1949). Defendant, 
held incommunicado ten days, attempted suicide; while weak from loss of blood, 
•oi 339 u.s. 56, 57 (1950). 
202 Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533 (1950) (majority); Int. Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481 (1950) (dissent). 
203 339 u.s. 56, 86 (1950). 
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he allegedly made certain statements which sheriff overheard and repeated in 
court. The lower court held that "the confession or admission testified to by the 
sheriff was overheard and not extorted." 
(b) Nos. 22r-222, Misc., In the matter of Marino, 404 ill. 35, 88 N.E. 2d 7, 8 
(r949). Two years ago the United States Supreme Court held that Marino, a 
recent immigrant who spoke no English and who was tried for a serious offense 
without an adequate interpreter and without counsel, had been denied due 
process. illinois, the state of his conviction, confessed error. The lower court in 
illinois nonetheless, on remand, refused to release him in an unreported de-
cision. The Supreme Court then denied certiorari. The matter then proceeded 
to the illinois Supreme Court, which in the case cited conceded that it was res 
adjudicata that "defendant was denied 'the due process of law which the r4th 
Amendment requires' "-but found that it was powerless to take any action. 
The Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 
(c) No. 387, 388, Misc., Ex parte Quillian, 89 N.E. 2d 493, 494 (Ohio, r949). 
Escaped prisoners held to have no right to raise issues of fairness of trial on ex-
tradition proceedings. Justice Douglas dissented from the denial. 
(d) No. 255, Hall v. United States, r76 F. 2d r63 (C.A. 2d, r949). Communist 
defendants, held in contempt for disturbance in open court; unusual penalty 
assessed. Justice Black dissented from this denial. 
(e) No. r68-r69, International Union, UMW v. United States, r77 F. 2d 29 
(App. D.C., I949). Fines double those of the earlier United Mine Workers case 
were assessed for contempt of district court's no-strike order. It was alleged, in 
part, that these fines had now become so enormous as to be a cruel and unusual 
punishment. Justices Black, Reed, and Douglas dissented from the denial of 
the writ, and Justice Clark did not participate. 
(f) No. 430, United States ex rel. Mobley v. Handy, r76 F. 2d 49I (C.A. sth, 
r949). The issue was whether the Army could arrest a civilian in Texas who had 
allegedly, as a civilian in Germany, escaped after being under arrest in Ger-
many. The fifth circuit denied habeas corpus. 
(g) No. 398, Pedigo v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 37r, 392, 493, 499, 5I4, 54 S.E. 
2d 22r et seq. (r949). Alleged contempt of injunction restraining mass picketing. 
Justice Black dissented from the denial of certiorari. 
(h) No. 509, Buteau v. Connecticut, I36 Conn. II3, 68 A. 2d 68r (I949), 
validity of confession in case in which defendant was held illegally for seven 
days in a police barracks, the state court finding, however, that "every con-
sideration was shown to the defendant which one arrested for a :first degree 
murder could have reasonably expected." 
(i) No. 494, Schoeps v. Landon, I71 F. 2d 39r (C.A. 9th, r949), a one day trip 
from California to Mexico and return held to amount to an "entry" under a 
criminal provision of the immigration laws, although the alien making the ex-
cursion had lived here twenty years. (It may be observed that he was an ob-
scenely unpleasant alien.) 
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\j) Nos. 197, 248, and 249 [see 176 F. 2d 473 (App. D.C., 1949)], Mars/tall, 
Lawson & Trumbo v. United States. The congressional authorization of the House 
Un-American Committee, and its works, held lawful. Justices Black and 
Douglas dissented. 
(k) No. 284, Lapides v. McGrath, 176 F. 2d 619 (APP.D.C., 1949), a statute 
providing that naturalized citizens shall lose their citizenship upon five years 
residence abroad held valid as against challenge that it makes an unconstitu-
tional distinction between naturalized and native-born citizens. 
The foregoing cases all involved refusals to hear cases at the behest of the 
individual whose liberties had allegedly been invaded. In No. 300, Maryland v. 
Baltimore Ra:dio Show, 67 A. 2d 497, 509 (1949), the Court declined to review 
.a Maryland decision which reversed a contempt order of a trial court against a 
local radio station. Justice Frankfurter filed an extended statement concerning 
this matter. 
NONCIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
(a) No. 92, Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire Co., 173 F. 2d 49 (C.A. 7th, 
1949). The lower court held that a licensee of patent rights under a system of 
agreements held to be illegal in a suit between the United States and the 
licensor could not recover the amount of the license fees paid in the absence of 
showing special damages. Justice Black dissented from the denial. 
(b) No. 331, Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 175 F. 2d 427 (C.A. 7th, 
1949). The lower court held that the Supreme Court's so-called "flash of genius" 
test was not meant to raise the level of invention in any way. 
(c) No. 488, National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 175 F. 2d 686 (C.A. 2d, 
1949). Taft-Hartley anti-hiring hall provisions held valid. 
(d) No. 358, Casselman v. Idaho, 69 Idaho 237, 205 P. 2d II31 (1949). Idaho 
secondary boycott act held valid. Justices Black, Reed and Burton dissented 
from the denial of certiorari. 
(e) No. 400, Fifth and Walnut v. Loew's, Inc., 176 F. 2d 587 (C.A. 2d, 1949). 
T]le judgment in United States v. Paramount was held not "final" and hence 
not usable in evidence under the Clayton Act in the many movie treble dam-
age cases. 
(f) Nos. 592, 593, United States v. Pevely Dairy Co., 178 F. 2d 363 (C.A. 8th, 
1949). Evidence held insufficient to sustain conviction of defendants for 
monopolizing milk sales in the St. Louis area. 
(g) No. 653, Stone v. Reicltman-Crosby Co., (Miss., Nov., 1949). The Missis-
sippi Supreme· Court invalidated a provision of t_he state's use tax requiring 
non-resident seller to collect tax from Mississippi customers. 
